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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

]

Plaintiff and Respondent,]
vs.

]

MICHAEL LEWIS GREEN, AKA
JAMES ALVIN DOUGLAS,

]
]

Defendant and Appellant. ))

C a s e N o . 890222-CA

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
JMISDI.CTI.ON AND_.JATURE....OJ„.JROCMDJJ.GS
This is an appeal from a final judgment and sentence of the
Court below from two second degree felony crimes, manufacturing a
controlled substance, and possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute, P-2-P.

Jurisdiction of this Court is

therefor conferred by Rule 26, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
and Section 78-2a-3(2)(f), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
POINT I:
THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED PURSUANT TO THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS
IMPROPERLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE AS OBTAINED BY ILLEGAL
SEARCH AND SIEZURE, BASED ON LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE
SEARCH WARRANT
POINT II:
EVIDENCE DISCOVERED IN THE SEARCH SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED BASED
ON ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SIEZURE SINCE SEARCHING PARTY WAS A
GOVENMENT EMPLOYEE OR AGENT, OR WAS ACTING IN SUCH A WAY AS
TO BE DEEMED A GOVERNMENT AGENT
POINT III:
THE DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE BY THE STATE DEPRIVED DEFENDANT
OF DUE PROCESS, A FAIR TRIAL, AND OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE HIS
DEFENSES

POINT IV:
THE AUTHORITY GIVEN THE U.S. CONGRESS OR U.S. ATTORNEY
GENERAL UNDER THE UTAH CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT TO
DESIGNATE, RESCHEDULE, OR REVISE BY ADDING, DELETING, OR
TRANSFERING SUBSTANCES ON THE SCHEDULES IS AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
POINT V:
THE AUTHORITY GIVEN THE U.S. CONGRESS OR U.S. ATTORNEY
GENERAL UNDER THE UTAH CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT TO
DESIGNATE, RESCHEDULE, OR REVISE BY ADDING, DELETING, OR
TRANSFERING SUBSTANCES ON THE SCHEDULES IS A DEPRIVATION OF
DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS TO REASONABLE NOTICE OF
PROSCRIBED CONDUCT
POINT VI:
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE THE JURY INSTRUCTION THAT
THE STATE HAD THE BURDEN OF PROVING THE PROPRIETY OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE FOR SCHEDULING THE TO-BE-CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by way of information with various
drug offenses, and was convicted, after a jury trial, of
manufacturing a controlled substance, to wit, P-2-P, a second
degree felony, and possession of a controlled substance with
intent to distribute, to wit, P-2-P, a second degree felony.
Andre Pommier testified at the hearing to suppress evidence
that he was a general contractor (see Reporter's Transcript of
Motions to Suppress, p. 89, January 18, 1989, hereinafter "S").
In addition, at the time of the events in this case, he worked
for the Brigham City Fire Department as an EMT (S 96, 101), as a
volunteer paid $7.50 per hour (S 96), paid from public funds (S
100) and had, since October of 1987, during periods while working
doing carpentry work for Defendant on Defendant's house, been the
Assistant Fire Marshall (S 100). At the work site, at
Defendant's house, he wore a beeper, and after October, 1987,
often carried a police radio to the work site at Defendant's home
(S 98, 99). As a fireman, Pommier had worked with the police a
lot of times when they were on scene for traffic control and
fires (S 117) at various locations.

If fact, after the issuance

of the search warrant, when the police were searching the
premises pursuant to the search warrant, Mr. Pommier himself was
at the search site acting in the paid (S 127) capacity of Fire
Chief (S 124), in charge of the Fire Department involvement in
the search (S 125).
Mr. Pommier started working for Defendant in the end of
January, 1987 (S 90), In the summer of 1987, Mr. Pommier was
doing various construction work at the home of the defendant (S

91-92).

Mr. Pommier testified that there was as part of

Defendant's house a locked garage Mr. Pommier had no authority to
enter (S 104). The windows to the garage had blinds closed on
them (S 106). In the summer of 1987 Mr. Pommier testified he
found a key, on a 2x4 on an atrium he was demolishing (S 91), and
tried it in the lock to the garage.

On finding that it worked,

he took the key, surreptitiously had a duplicate made (S 92), and
the next day returned the original key to the defendant (107108), never telling Defendant that he had made a copy (S 115).
He then picked a time when the defendant was not present (S 108)
and broke into the garage.

On at least five other occasions,

ending in March of 1988, he again admitted to having broken into
the garage of the defendant without any authority to do so, and
against the expressed and known wishes of the defendant (S 94,
114) .
////
////

A

Mr. Pommier testified that he never stole anything from the
premises, nor took anything other than the key from the defendant
(S 105). He further testified that he took his actions merely
out of "curiosity" (S 93), and at least at one point was
concerned about some water that was coming out of the closed
garage (Si 120). He also testified that he was aware by his
personal knowledge that the home had, just prior to being
purchased by the defendant, been owned by Mr. Bob Wendell, who he
knew for many years was a high school chemistry professor (S
109) .
Mr. Pommier testified that on approximately April 22, 1988,
he quit his employment with the defendant (S 116). He then
testified that his "guilty conscience" (S 95) got the better of
him, and in the latter part of June, 1988, went to his co-fireman
on the Fire Department (S 47-48), Detective Yeates, a Sheriff, to
tell him of his suspicions and information with regard to what
was contained in the garage.
Defendant testified he'd disallowed Mr. Pommier any access
to the garage, or the house while he was away (S 139), and which
garage was kept locked.

Further, Defendant testified Mr. Pommier

had been fired from his employment the end of April, 1987, as a
result of Mr. Pommier stealing money from Defendant's house (S
140).

Defendant told Mr. Pommier that Mr. Douglas might have to

go to the police about the theft. (S 140).
Defendant testified Mr. Pommier told him during his
employment that Mr. Pommier was the Assistant Fire Marshal, and
at another point, the Acting Fire Marshal (p. 142). Mr. Pommier
had told Defendant he'd have to leave, and did leave, the

premises occasionally to make fire inspections (S 142). Mr.
Pommier normally carried a police radio with him on the job at
Defendant's house, tuned-in so one could hear the chatter on the
band (S 142).
Box Elder County Sheriff Detective Lynn Yeates was called to
testify.

He testified that he and Mr. Pommier were both workers

on the ambulance, for the Brigham City Fire Department, Ambulance
(S 77). About June 27, 1988, Mr. Pommier met him on the street
and told him he thought there was "something wrong" (S 81) up at
a house in Perry, Utah, Defendant's house.

He said at the house

were containers of ether, chloroform, sodium acetate, sulfuric
acid, and something else the witness couldn't remember (S 82).
Detective Yeates took this information to Detective Johnson.
Deputy Sheriff, Detective Mike Johnson testified that the
"confidential informant" in the Affidavit Requesting Issuance of
Search Warrant (Appendix 1-7) was Mr. Pommier. The trial court,
at the suppression hearing, acknowledged it had before it the
signed original search warrant, the signed Affidavit aforesaid,
and the Deposition and Affidavit of Mike Johnson (Appendix 8-10).
Detective Johnson met with Mr. Pommier on June 29, 1988 (S 47)
and reviewed a book with pictures of chemical equipment, and Mr.
Pommier identified some of the items he said he saw in the garage
(S 40). Later, Mr. Johnson executed the Affidavit and the
Deposition and Affidavit, and the court executed the Search
Warrant (Appendix 11-12).

The affidavits and search warant were

signed about September 14, 1988.

The search warrant was executed

on the residence on about September 15, 1988 (Reporter's Trial

Transcript vol. 1, hereinafter "Rl", p. 55), at which time
Defendant was taken into custody.
Detective Yeates was in charge of the evidence seized at the
home of the defendant pursuant to the search warrant issued by
Judge Daines (S 10). Detective Yeates testified that there were
80 to 100 chemicals seized and present at the home (S 15).
Further, there were greater than a hundred different batches of
chemicals stored at the defendant's home.

Some of these were in

their original containers, including shipping containers (S 15),
while others were in unmarked packages (S 15). Detective Yates
testified that he assisted the D.E.A. chemist (S 11) (Mr. Chuck
Hall, a forensic chemist with the Drug Engorcement
Administration), in the taking of samples.

He testified that

they took twelve or thirteen samples among all the chemicals (S
11).

Further, Mr. Hall determined the amount and which chemicals

were to be sampled (S 17).
Detective Yates was informed by Chuck Hall that the
chemicals could constitute a hazard and that all of the items
should be destroyed (S 12, Rl 124, 90-1).

Part of this was

because of a white powder of unknown substance which was in
copious quantities and covered much of the interior of the garage
where the chemicals were found (Rl 102). Based upon that,
Detective Yeates had all of the chemicals, except for the twelve
to thirteen samples, destroyed or disposed of (S 12, 13).
Mr. Chuck Hall was called to testify with regard to the
chemicals.

He is a forensic chemist for the Drug Enforcement

Administration, having received a bachelors degree in chemistry
in 1961 (S 22).

7

Mr. Hall testified that there were over 100 containers of
different chemicals, some of them still in their original
containers (S 27).

Further, Defendant testified there were

thousands of items there in the garage where samples were taken
(Reporter's Transcript of Trial, Volume 2, hereinafter "R2" 495).
In addition, there were large amounts of chemicals in a storage
room in the house, but they did not take any samples from said
storage room.
Defendant testified at trial his father had been a licensed
pharmacist (R2 476), that Defendant had a lifelong hobby of
raising tropical plants (R2 478), fertilized, sprayed, and added
nutrients to the soil (R2 479). He had a collection of chemicals
to pursue his chemistry hobby (R2 495). He dabbled in making
sprays, plant growth hormone, and 20 to 30 other projects (R2
495).

He made solar feed, fertilizer, ammonium phosphate

compounds, and materials to change p.h. of the soil (R2 500).

He

had worked in the past at jobs where he sold chemicals, and had
been an officer in a chemical company (R2 499).
Mr. Hall recommended that they take small parts of "key1*
chemicals for analysis, and had Detective Yates help him with
those samples (S 11). His testimony was that those samples were
approximately 1 ounce in size (S 30). However, no sample was
taken of the white substance that appeared to cover everything (S
29) .
He then testified that all of the chemicals except for the
samples were potentially hazards, and that they should be
destroyed.

This was notwithstanding the fact that many of them

were in sealed and original containers, including shipping

containers, which would pass without objection in interstate
travel (S 26). Further, with regard to which chemicals were kept
or sampled, no further bases or foundation or test was testified
to other than what he deemed might be "key" chemicals.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I:
THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED PURSUANT TO THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS
IMPROPERLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE AS OBTAINED BY ILLEGAL
SEARCH AND SIEZURE, BASED ON LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE
SEARCH WARRANT
The affidavits supporting the issuance of the search warrant
stated no percipient evidence of the existence of illegal drugs,
nor of any activities other than legal ones.

False statements

were made in the affidavits which must be excised, and
information unrevealed in the affidavit has to be taken into
consideration.

The informant was not reliable, and the warrant

was based on information overly stale.
POINT II:
EVIDENCE DISCOVERED IN THE SEARCH SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED BASED
ON ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SIEZURE SINCE SEARCHING PARTY WAS A
GOVENMENT EMPLOYEE OR AGENT, OR WAS ACTING IN SUCH A WAY AS
TO BE DEEMED A GOVERNMENT AGENT
The informant's actions in breaking into Defendants garage
six times constituted actions of a government entity or sovereign
for purposes of search and siezure; first, his Government
function covered the type of actions and investigations he
undertook in this case, and, second, he was acting with the state
of mind and with the type of actions conducive to being deemed to
be acting as a Governmental agent in connection with the
investigation.
POINT III:
THE DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE BY THE STATE DEPRIVED DEFENDANT
OF DUE PROCESS, A FAIR TRIAL, AND OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE HIS
DEFENSES

Since the State destroyed a large quantity of chemicals
after selectively sampling only a few, instead of preserving the
evidence or sampling all chemicals, it deprived Defendant of
exonerating evidence in a constitutionally material way, to his
prejudice before the jury.
POINT IV:
THE AUTHORITY GIVEN THE U.S. CONGRESS OR U.S. ATTORNEY
GENERAL UNDER THE UTAH CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT TO
DESIGNATE, RESCHEDULE, OR REVISE BY ADDING, DELETING, OR
TRANSFERING SUBSTANCES ON THE SCHEDULES IS AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
Utah has forbidden the delegation to others of the
legislative right to proscribe what drugs shall be controlled
substances.

Furthermore, to delegate to the Congress or the U.S.

Attorney General the power to create felony crimes, and fix
punishments therefor, is an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power, and to allow that delegation to occur in the
future, prospectively, is especially improper.
POINT V:
THE AUTHORITY GIVEN THE U.S. CONGRESS OR U.S. ATTORNEY
GENERAL UNDER THE UTAH CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT TO
DESIGNATE, RESCHEDULE, OR REVISE BY ADDING, DELETING, OR
TRANSFERING SUBSTANCES ON THE SCHEDULES IS A DEPRIVATION OF
DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS TO REASONABLE NOTICE OF
PROSCRIBED CONDUCT
The method used in the Utah Controlled Substance Act
purportedly delegating to and enabling the U.S. Attorney General
to add, delete, and reschedule drugs from the schedules, requires
a person to constantly review the Federal Register and Code of
Federal Regulations, and is unduly confusing, and in constant
flux.

As a result, the statute fails to give reasonable notice

of proscribed conduct to a person of average intelligence.
POINT VI:

THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE THE JURY INSTRUCTION THAT
THE STATE HAD THE BURDEN OF PROVING THE PROPRIETY OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE FOR SCHEDULING THE TO-BE-CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE
Defendant requested an instruction to the jury outlining
that the State had the burden of proving proper compliance with
administrative requirements on the part of the U.S. Attorney
General in adding P-2-P to the federal list of controlled
substances.

The denial of the instruction was error.

ARGUMENT
POINT I:
THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED PURSUANT TO THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS
IMPROPERLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE AS OBTAINED BY ILLEGAL
SEARCH AND SIEZURE, BASED ON LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE
SEARCH WARRANT
The evidence gathered as a result of the search pursuant to
the search warrant, chemical samples, appartus, equipment, etc.
papers, and observations, should be suppressed.

There was no

probable cause to support the issuance of the warrant.

This is

based upon the allegations as set forth in the affidavit, the
separate and related ground that the false statements contained
in the affidavit need to be excised, and after they are excised,
there is clearly not probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant, and finally that the evidence is sufficiently stale and
there is no evidence that it was current, to justify a finding of
probable cause as of the date of issuance.
The Utah Supreme Court has discussed and set forth the
standard with regard to the requirements of affidavits to support
a search warrant in the case of „Sjtaj^^^
(Utah 1987).

732 P.2d 127

The Court stated, at page 130:

"Search warrant affidavits are to be construed in a
common-sense, reasonable manner. State v. Williamson, 674

P.2d 132, 133 (Utah 1983); State v. Pursell, 586 P.2d 441
(Utah 1978). Excessive technical dissection of an
informant's tip or of the nontechnical language in the
officer's affidavit is ill-suited to this task. (Illinois
X^..Gat.es) 462 U.S. at 231-32, 235-36, 103 S.Ct. at 2328-30,
2330-31. In Gajt.es, the Supreme Court emphasized that an
informant's "reliability" and "basis of knowledge" are but
two relevant considerations, among others, in determining
the existence of probable cause under "a totality-of-thecircumstances." 462 U.S. at 231-32, 235-36, 103 S.Ct. at
2328-30, 2330-31. They are not strict, independent
requirements to be "rigidly exacted" in every case. A
weakness in one or the other is not fatal to the warrant so
long as in the totality there is substantial basis to find
probable cause. JjdL at 230, 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2328, 2332.
The indicia of veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge
are nonexclusive elements to be evaluated in reaching the
practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the
circumstances, there is a fair probability that the
contraband will be found in the place described."
The United States Supreme Court, as well as the Utah Supreme
Court, has rejected as hypertechnical the old Ajgu^
two-pronged test which required separate and technical
requirements of showing separately that the informant's tips set
out the underlying circumstances 1) to reveal the basis of the
knowledge, and 2) to establish the veracity or reliability.

The

Court thus looks at those issues of basis, knowledge and
reliability in order to be able to conclude that probable cause
existed.

As stated in JLtaJte^

675 P. 2d 1203 (Utah

1984), a case again decided after the rejection of the technical
requirements of Aguilar-.Spinel 1 i , at page 1205:
"However, even under this standard, compliance with the
Aguilar-Spinelli guidelines may be necessary to make a
sufficient basis for probable cause. Depending on the
circumstances, a showing of the basis of knowledge and
veracity or reliability of the person providing the
information for a warrant may well be necessary to establish
with a fair "probability" that the evidence sought actually
exists and can be found where the informant states."

It is respecfully submitted that that burden cannot be
established in connection with the affidavit filed herein.

As

noted in the recitation of facts, all of the chemicals possessed,
as well as chemicals set forth in the affidavit (Appendix 1-7),
are themselves lawful to possess, and no presumption of
illegality can occur from their mere possesion.

There are two

attempts to provide probable cause that a crime had been
committed and there was evidence of a crime at the defendant's
residence, neither one of which is sufficient, pursuant to
BaL.ii.ejf, to support a probable cause finding.

With regard to the

statements of the confidential informant, the statement "there is
a clandestine-type lab producing an illegal substance" is without
any foundation as to his knowledge or ability to perceive those
items ("clandestine", "illegal substance"), let alone his ability
to conclude that that is what is going on.

There are no

statements setting forth that the confidential informant, Mr.
Pommier, has any experience or knowledge concerning chemistry or
the manufacture of illegal substances.

Thus, there is absolutely

no basis or foundation showing his knowledge, veracity or
reliability as to the existence of a clandestine-type lab.
The other matters as set forth in the affidavit were a
conversation between Detective Yeates and Art Turkelson, a
criminologist.

Detective Johnson alleges in the affidavit,

paragraph 16(a), that based upon the description of the equipment
and glassware, which neither Yeates nor Turkelson had seen, and
the named chemicals, being four completely legal chemicals, that
it was "consistent with the type of equipment and chemicals used
to produce methamphetamine or a substance known as phenyl-2-

propanone."

There is nothing, however, to indicate that it is

inconsistent with any other use, or to in any manner tie the
defendant in with any illegal activities, let alone drug
activities.

In the affidavit, they allege he does not have a

license to produce controlled substances, but there is no
information or belief that he has any history of drug
involvement, any knowledge or skills concerning production of
illegal substances, or any desire to.

Further, again there is a

problem with regard to the basis of knowledge and the conclusion
drawn in that Turkelson is apparently saying that the existence
of five named chemicals out of many others that are unnamed, and
equipment which a non-technical trained person has listed and
described, would be the basis for the reasonable conclusion and
fair probability that this otherwise respectable citizen,
innocent, with no further indicia of criminal activity, is
engaged in the production of a controlled substance.

Further,

there is no way that the possession of the four chemicals listed,
which are legal to have, could support probable cause to believe
that controlled substances being produced—otherwise all Chemical
Companies would of course be subject to search at any time.
Furthermore, the search warrant authorized the search for illegal
drugs at a certain home, as well as the person of James Douglas.
Therefore, looking at the totality of circumstance, there is a
lack of probable cause; the search warrant was invalid, and the
evidence must be excluded.
In addition to the above, there is a problem with regard to
two direct misstatements in the affidavit, which must be excised
from the affidavit prior to consideration as to probable cause.

As noted in Hansen, .id., at page 130, "A warrant may be invalid
if the supporting affidavit contains a misstatement which
'materially affects the findings of probable cause.'(Citation
omitted,)"

That is required as a matter of constitutional law if

there is a false statement, it should be at a minimum excised
from the warrant.

See .State v, Nielsen, 727 P. 2d 188 (Utah

198 6), and Franks v_j_DeLawar,e, 98 S.Ct. 2674 (1978).

In

addition, misstatement by omission would also constitute an
improper action, and the true facts from the admission may be
required to be read as if in the original affidavit.

See State

JLa_Nielsen, id. at 191.
Officer Johnson, Officer Yeates, as well as Mr. Pommier, the
confidential informant, all agreed that when Mr. Pommier came to
the officers he didn't know what the chemicals were, the purposes
therefor, or what was going on, but rather that he just had some
suspicions about it (S 82, 138). Thus, the statement in
paragraph 4 of the affidavit, that the confidential informant
"told your affiant of what he believed to be a clandestine-type
lab producing illegal substances located at the residence in
Perry" is a direct misstatement.

Further, Officer Johnson

admitted in his testimony that he was unsure as to whether he
supplied the words "clandestine type lab" or whethem Mr. Pommier
did (S 137). Therefore, since that is very likely not what Mr.
Pommier told the officers, because he did not have any basis and
did not know that, that was a misstatement which was put in
knowingly, intentionally, and recklessly with regard to its
truth, and must be excised.

See State y. Nielsen, jsu.&r.a, id.

The second clear misstatement is the statement that the
chemicals as set forth in the affidavit would produce a
controlled substance known as phenyl-2-propanone.

Phenyl-2-

propanone (P-2-P) is nowhere mentioned in the Utah Controlled
Substance Act with regard to what are controlled substances,
although it may be listed in the federal regulations.

The Utah

Supreme Court disallowed delegation in S.t^te_x.-. Ga.LiiSS/ 57 2 P. 2
683 (Utah 1977).

Had the magistrate known this uncertainty abou

P-2-P, he may well not have issued the warrant.
Finally, there is a factual mattter which was well-known to
the officers and the confidential informant, which was obviously
intentionally omitted, which should be read in.

That fact is

that although mentioned in paragraph 4 that the residence "known
to your affiant as the Bob Wendell home", it is not mentioned or
detailed that Mr. Wendell was, for many years, the high school
chemistry teacher, and had just recently sold the house and move
to Arizona.

Detective Johnson knew this (S 54). So did Mr.

Pommier (S 109). Yet it was not revealed to the Magistrate.
Since it is alleged that the existence of chemicals and chemical
apparatus is suspicious, the fact that they know the house was
recently purchased from a chemistry teacher who, one would
naturally assume, would have substantial chemicals and lab
equipment stored in his home, would bear on the issue as to the
suspicious nature of the items.

Therefore, that fact should be

read back into the affidavit.
Making those changes, we have a situation where an
individual has seen chemicals, the character of which he has no
knowledge, and chemistry equipment in a home recently purchased

from a high school chemistry teacher, but is suspicious, that the
chemicals and apparatus described are consistent with the
production of a controlled and an uncontrolled substance, the
affidavit clearly has a different flavor, meaning, and effect,
and probable cause evaporates.
The final concern as to the existence of probable cause has
to do with the currency of the information set forth in the
affidavit.

The information is too stale to justify any probable

cause, and the State failed, in its affidavit to set forth the
matter that the information was timely, current, and that
probable cause existed at the time of the execution of the
warrant.
The warrant in this case was issued Septemeber 14, 1988, and
served the following day.

First, as noted in the affidavit, the

confidential informant is alleged to have "personally been in the
residence on numerous occasions between the dates of January,
1986 and April 22, 1988", the only pertinent times given in the
Affidavits.

See paragraph 7 of affidavit (Appendix, 3). Second,

the confidential informant is alleged to have first met with the
officers on June 29, 1988.

Although some surveillance occurred

after the June date (Appendix 3-7) there is no further
information with regard to any allegation of continuing illegal
activity, any production of a controlled substance, transporting,
sales of other chemicals brought into the house, or anything
else.

There is nothing to indicate that to the extent that there

was any illegal activity going on in April 1988, that it was
still continuing and on-going in September 1988, when the search
warrant issued.

In United .States.J/,_Craig, 674 F Supp 561 (WD La, 1987), it
is soundly stated that where the affidavit on which the search
warrant is based describes the offense as having occurred within
a certain time period but without specifying dates, the court
reviewing the question of staleness of information must presume
that the transactions took place in the most remote part of the
time span, otherwise any ancient evidence could be used by merely
describing it as falling within a period of time ending with the
current date.
Staleness--and the flip-side, the currency of information-is an essential determination of probable cause.

As stated in

United States^v. McCall, 740 F.2d 1331 (4th Cir. 1984), at pages
1335-6:
"The Fourth Amendment bars search warrants issued on
less than probable cause, and there is no question that time
is a crucial element of probable cause. As valid search
warrant may issue only upon allegation of "facts so closely
related to the time of the issue of the warrant as to
justify a finding of probable cause at that time. Whether
the proof meets this test must be dtermined by the
circumstances of each case." Consequently, evidence seized
pursuant to a warant supported by "stale" probable cause is
not admissible in a criminal trial to establish the
defendantf s guilt."
"Cases in which staleness becomes an issue arise in two
different contexts. First, the facts alleged in the warrant
may have been sufficient to establish probable cause when
the warrant was issued, but the government's delay in
executing the warrant possibly tainted the search. Second,
the warrant itself may be suspect because the information on
which it rested was arguably too old to furnish "present"
probable cause."
Further, it would be the State's duty and burden to demonstrate,
within the four corners of the affidavit, the currency of the
information.

In United Statesy.,Salvucci, 599 F.2d 1094 (1st

Cir. 1979), the case concerned unlawful possession of checks

stolen from the mail.

The affidavit and circumstances of the

case discussed a receipt of information on October 24, 1976, with
regard to the checks and purchases thereof.

There was then an

undated specification of a conversation, supposedly with the
defendant there confirming information of the existence of stolen
checks and their location in the house.
on December 15th, 1976.

A search warrant issued

The Court there held that there was not

sufficient probable cause based upon the staleness of the
information.

As stated by the Court at page 1096:

"Without this date (of the conversation), there is no
way for the Magistrate to determine whether the information
was sufficiently timely to support the warrant."
In the present case, there is alleged in the affidavit, whether
true or not, an over two-year period of when the confidential
informant was in the property, January 1986 through April 22,
1988.

There is no indication of when the last time he had seen

those chemicals or the apparatus on the premises.

Thus, it would

be just as reasonable to conclude that he only saw them in
January 1986 as to him seeing them on April 22, 1988.
In addition, there was nothing to indicate that in September
1988 there was nay continued validity to the information.
It is noted that in S^ate.„„v„. Hansen, sujDra, the Utah Supreme
Court said, at 131, "A mere passage of time does not necessarily
invalidate the supporting basis for the warrant."

However, here

we have no indication of when the items were actually seen in the
house, and there is no indication of any supporting basis for
their continuing to be there.

Thus, there is more than the mere

passage of time to destroy the original validity, if any, to the
information, and it's existence on September 15, 1988.
Another aspect of the probable cause dilemma is the
reliability of the informant.

In the case at hand, the police

officers had heard the informant admit to secretly copying a key,
and breaking in while the owner was away on at least six
occasions.

Most telling, by his story, he did this over the

course of a year without telling the police.

The more credible

reason for his delay, Officer Johnson should have concluded, was
to protect the informants surrepticious opportunities.
The trial court denied Defendants motion to suppress on this
ground, in its Memorandum Decision (Appendix 36, 37).
POINT II:
EVIDENCE DISCOVERED IN THE SEARCH SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED BASED
ON ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SIEZURE SINCE SEARCHING PARTY WAS A
GOVENMENT EMPLOYEE OR AGENT, OR WAS ACTING IN SUCH A WAY AS
TO BE DEEMED A GOVERNMENT AGENT
It is the defendant's position that there are in essence
three reasons why any evidence obtained as a result of Mr.
Pommier's entry into the defendant's garage should be disallowed
as evidence.

The first is that Mr. Pommier was a government

employee or agent when he conducted the searches.

The second

corollary argument is that during those searches he was acting as
an agent of the government, and therefore the searches also
trigger the United States Fourth Amendment sanctions as well as
Article I, Section 14 of the State constitutional provisions.
Finally, that the illegal actions of Mr. Pommier in and of
themselves should bar the use of the evidence.

Mr. Pommier made at least six unauthorized and illegal
entries into the garage of the defendant.

He acted from his

curiosity, his desire to discover what was inside, his concern as
to the source of water or other material coming out of the
garage, as well as his concern and worry about the storage and
containment of the items found therein, his suspicions as to the
nature of the circumstances, and finally, for reasons known only
to him.

These correspond with concerns, issues, and functions in

his official capacity with the Brigham City Fire Department.
The Utah Supreme Court, as well as federal courts, have held
that the proscriptions of the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, as well as the provisions of Article I,
Section 14, Utah Constitution, act as M...a restraint only upon
the activities of sovereign authority and is not applicable to
the searches and seizures by any persons other than government
officers and agents."
at 1221.

State v._Watts, 750 P. 2d 1219 (Utah 1933)

However, such officers and agents are not limited to

police officers, but clearly involve other government officials
and agencies who have a regulatory function.

A classic example

would be a school teacher, whose private search of a student
triggers Fourth Amendment concerns.
As the Assistant or Acting Fire Marshall, Mr. Pommier's
duties would naturally include the investigation and inspection
of storage facilities to determine whether or not fire hazards
exist, to seek out various arson possibilities and fires, and to
perform other regulatory and investigatory functions.

His duties

in inspecting the garage, based upon his curiosity, suspicions,
and the water leaving, therefore, were in performance of those

duties.

He admitted he understood his duties to include business

and home inspections.

The only alternative explanation, rejected

by Mr. Pommier, was that he desired to misappropriate things from
the premises.

Further, he is probably within the definitional

provisions of a special function officer under U.C.A. Section 77l(a)-4 (Appendix 13) as a fire arson investigator.

Further,

during his investigations as to the storage of the chemicals in
the garage, he would be engaged in his duties, therefore a
special function officer, and therefore, by definition, a peace
officer.
It must also be remembered that there were at least six
entries by Mr. Pommier.

Even if one were to give Mr. Pommier and

the State the- benefit of the doubt as to the first entry, where
he was concerned about the water, he discovered the water, saw
various chemicals, did not repair the water (S 120), and left.
His subsequent entry based upon his suspicions and curiosity-especially if triggered by the chemicals, would clearly be
because of his knowledge, expertise and concerns for the
chemicals, unless the Court believes that he was not truthful
when he denied a criminal intent to steal.

Therefore, assuming a

proper first entry, the subsequent entries along the line are the
result of Mr. Pommier acting as a fire marshal 1, or in his
official capacity as an employee of the State, investigating
suspicious circumstances and concerns, thereby makin him an agent
of the State and triggering the warrant requirements.

If any of

those entries is as an agent or employee of a governmental
entity, the information gained therein and therefrom, including
the warrant based upon information provided, is improper and the

fruit of that unlawful search.

See State \ri_Jj^

716 P 2d

1288 (Idaho 1986), and Wong Sun v. United States, 83 S. Ct. 407
(1963).
The second basis for exclusion is that under the
circumstances of this case, Mr. Pommier was acting as an agent.
Even though not an actual employee, a private person can be an
agent for purposes of the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution or Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution
under certain circumstances.

As set forth and discussed in

Waits, supra, there are two critical areas of inquiry, either one
of which can turn an otherwise private citizen into an agent for
purposes of the exclusionary rule. Those are:

1) the

government's knowledge and acquiescence in intrusive conduct, and
2) the intent and purpose of the person conducting the search.
With regard to the knowledge of and acquiescence in test,
the argument set forth above as to the actuality of his agency as
a fire marshal 1 and members of the fire department applies here.
His knowledge, actions, and activity go to the "government's"
knowledge of an acquiescence in the intrusive conduct. Mr.
Pommier spent considerable time and effort to gather information,
committing at least six illegal acts in connection with the
breaking into the garage.

Further, these occurred over a

lengthy period, and when a dispute arose, he finally called in
assistance in connection with his fellow fireman, Deputy Yeates.
Thus, there was sufficient government knowledge and acquiescence
in the intrusive conduct to warrant application of the
exclusionary rule.

It is noteworthy that Mr. Pommier, while working at
Defendant's home, always wore a beeper for his fire work, and for
a lengthy period, normally had his dispatch radio with him,
tuned-in and on.
function.

As such, he was always working in a dual

His invasion of Defendant's privacy was precisely the

type one would expect from a Fire Marshal 1—an

inspection.

The second prong of the test under Watts, is the "intent and
purpose of the person conducting the search.ff

The Utah court

discussed, with approval, U ni .ted S t. a tes._ v... _ W §l..t h e r , 652 F2d 782
(9th C i r . 1 9 8 1 ) .

That involved a situation where an airline

employee searched what he deemed a suspicious "Speed P a k " and
turned the information over to the DEA.

Although it is true that

the employee had been previously rewarded for such information by
the DEA, he testified he had no reason to expect to be paid in
the instant case, nor had he reason not to expect payment.

The

court found this otherwise private airline employee to be an
agent of the government for purposes of consitutional
protections.

The court stressed three reasons set forth for the

justification of that conclusion:

That the employee opened the

case because of a suspicion of illegal d r u g s , there were no
legitimate business considerations for the actions of the
employee, and the expectation of potential reward.

The court

therefore concluded, with apparent approval of the Utah court,
"We are thus satisfied that Rivard (the employee) opened the
package with the requisite mental state of "an instrument or
a g e n t . 1 " (At 7 9 2 . ) T h u s , the state of mind and reason for the
action of the private individual, when there is any government
inunlv^ment. is of crucial concern.

Further, the court

indicates

that "we also look at the informant's purpose in making the
search."
Clearly here, in the absence of an intent to steal, the
intent was to view the premises, discover contraband, and to
gather evidence, since the only conclusion possible is that Mr.
Pommier went back so many times (more than necessary to satisfy
"curiosity") to investigate what was going on, to discover what
was in there, going so far as to note or commit to memory the
names written on various packages that he saw.

His state of mind

was to gather information and evidence, to turn over to the
appropriate authorities in the Government.

Therefore, his

actions were unreasonable, required a warrant, and therefore any
evidence found thereby should be suppressed.
Finally, there is a concern as to the State being allowed to
use the illegal actions of Mr. Pommier to prosecute an
individual.

We have a situation where the police officers have

obtained evidnce by illegal means, although such might not have
been done by them personally.

As such, the sense of justice and

the constitutional rights of due process of law are involved, see
Stajte y„.. Louden, 387 P. 2d 240 (Utah 1963), and this court, as a
court of law, justice, and equity, applying the law as it exists
and exercising supervisory authority over the officers and
parties before it, should disallow this evidence.
The trial court denied Defendants motion to suppress on this
ground, in its Memorandum Decision (Appendix 36, 37).
POINT III:
THE DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE BY THE STATE DEPRIVED DEFENDANT
OF DUE PROCESS, A FAIR TRIAL, AND OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE HIS
DEFENSES

The destruction by the State of all of the chemicals, and
only taking a non-random sampling of twelve or thirteen of the
chemicals, when the State is going to attempt to use the
particular twelve chemicals as sampled as proof that they could
only have been used for the purposes of producing a controlled
substance constitute a denial of the defendant's rights to the
due process of law, and that the evidence of the particular
chemicals should be suppressed.

Finally, the Court at a minimum

should have disallowed any mention of all of the other chemical
substances seized and destroyed by the plaintiff without testing
and analysis as to what those substances were.
In State. v. Lovato, 702 P. 2d 101 (Utah 1985), the defendant
was convicted of aggravated sexual assault alleged to have been
aided by the use of a knife. The knife was lost or thrown away by
the State and among other grounds, the defendant claimed that
that denied him his rights.

The Court upheld again the doctrine

that the State's destruction of evidence, under certain
circumstances, consitutes denial of due process, but held that in
that case the knife was not sufficiently material, in the
consitutional sense, to warrant it.

The Court in arriving at its

decision, stated, at page 106:
"In State..,!, Stewart, Utah 544 P. 2d 477 (1975), we
said, '[A] deliberate suppression or destruction of evidence
by those charged with the prosecution, including police
officers, constitutes a denial of due process .if the
.eVJLdence is.._ma.ter..ia.l to guilt or innocence of the defendant
in a criminal case..." JIcL at 479 (Emphasis added.) We
clarified this proposition in S, t a jt e„ v ..._.N eb e k e r , Utah, 657
P.2d 1359 (1983), where we said, "The materiality required
to reverse a criminal conviction for suppression or
destruction of evidence as a denial of due process is more
than evidentiary materiality.' JEdL at 1363. Rather, it
must be ''maJteri,aJLJL&JU^
X<L.
(emphasis added). Constitutional materiality requires that

there be a showing that the suppressed or destroyed evidence
is vital to the issues of whether the defendant is quilty of
the charge and whether there is a fundamental unfairness
that requires the Court to set aside the defendant's
conviction. JEcL A corollary of this proposition is, 'The
mere p.ossjjbjj^ijtj; that an item of undisclosed information
Hliafet have helped the defense, or might have affected the
outcome of the trial, does not establish "materiality" in
the constitutional sense.' United States v. Agurs f< 427 U.S.
97, 109-10, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 1 4 ^ ^ 4 ^ 7 1 9 ETTEd.Td 3 42 (1976)
(emphasis added); .aceor^JNheb^jer, 657 P. 2d at 13
63."
In State v.,. SMIle.L.,. 725 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986), the Utah
Supreme Court dealt with another claim of destruction of evidence
by the State.

In that case, the State cremated the victim's

remains prior to the arrest of the defendant for the death.

The

defendant claimed that that denied him the right to perform tests
(to see if gunpowedr residue was on the hands of the victim) of a
possible exculpatory nature.

There again, the Supreme Court held

that the materiality of the evidence was not sufficient in the
constitutional sense, quoting with approval from „Sta..te v... Lo.vat.O/
s.MB..L§....!.

The court set forth the standard at page 1306 as follows:
"We agree with the State of Washington that the
appropriate standard requires the prosecution 'to preserve
that [evidence] which comes into [the prosecutor's]
possession either as a tangible object or sense impression,
if it is reasonably apparent the object or sense impression
potentially constitute [sic] material evidence.' State v.
Hall, 22 Wash.App. at 867, 593 P.2d at 558."
In the case at bar, the State's whole theory of their case
is a function of what chemicals are together, in what proportion,
and excluding innocent uses for those chemicals.

As such, the

existence, analysis, and presence of those chemicals is of
critical and vital importance to the guilt or innocence of the
defendant.

It was clearly understood by the chemists that some

samples and amounts had to be preserved in order to prove the
State's case.

By the destruction of all other chemicals, it

denied the defendant the possibility of exculpatory evidence as
to other chemicals, uses, and combinations of chemicals.
was no "mere possibility".

This

Defendant testified at trial

concerning the specific uses he put the chemicals to, but it was
of little value, given the enormous prejudicial effect of the
government's expressed judgment of having destroyed the chemicals
as "hazardous", even those in their packing containers, and the
implication that bore on what the government really believed the
chemicals consisted of.

The jury was thereby allowed to

speculate all the chemicals were intended for contraband and were
culpable.

It is thus material in the constitutional sense.

Samples should have been taken of all of the chemicals or all of
the chemicals maintained.

Further, the State cannot demonstrate

any sufficient need for the destruction of all of the chemicals
without at least taking a sample of them.

As testified to by Mr.

Hall, many household chemicals are far more dangerous and
hazardous than those that were destroyed (S 31).
Further, there is no presentation of any systematic,
logical, or inherently reasonable methodology of the choice of
the sampling and the choice of the structuring, In the absence
of, the Court cannot conclude that the officers acted in good
faith for valid reasons in their nonrandom sampling and their
intentional destruction of the proposed evidence which they used
against the defendant, all to the denial of due process rights to
preservation of evidence.

In Arizgna^y.^ Younjg.bl.qpd, 109 S.Ct. 333 (1988), the police
had taken swabs and stains with a sexual assault kit from a ten
year old boy who had been sodomized.

Defendant's claim was that

the State failed to preserve items which could possibly be useful
as a defense, and failed to do certain investigatory tests which
might have revealed further information.

The State in Youngblood

kept the evidence, but it was not testable in its final
conditions.

The nature of the destruction and the type of

evidence involved in this case is different that that of
Yqungblopd.

It is the State's theory in this case that a certain

group and combination of chemicals sole function and use would be
illegal.

To prove that, they took samples of twelve out of over

a hundred chemicals, and claimed that all of the chemicals could
only have an illegal use as shown by the twelve that they
sampled.

The defendant was denied the opportunity to prove what

the other chemicals were, and that there were other combinations
and other lawful uses for said chemicals.

The State's case was

one based on circumstantial evidence and the State intentionally
limited what evidence was available to prove the circumstances to
what they wanted to be believed.

There is a difference between

the State doing nothing and allowing a medical swab (as in
Youngblood) to become untestable by the action of nature, and
affirmative ordering the destruction of evidence, as was done in
the case at bar.
Finally, the Supreme Court of Utah has spoken on the issue,
in connection with the type of evidence herein, and has it's own
standard and test.

Further, these cases note the difference when

the evidence is of a "material nature in the constitutional

sense," as opposed to merely "possibly revelant."
Myat.0..,., 702 P.2nd 101 (Utah 1985).

See S.tat.e vs_..

Thus, Utah recognizes the

different types of evidence as were involved here, and has a
different test for those, as well as for the State of Utah, than
is set forth in A r i. z on a _ v s. Xoyng.bI.ogd, s up. r a .
The trial court denied Defendants motion to suppress on this
ground, in its Memorandum Decision (Appendix 36, 37).
POINT IV:
THE AUTHORITY GIVEN THE U.S. CONGRESS OR U.S. ATTORNEY
GENERAL UNDER THE UTAH CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT TO
DESIGNATE, RESCHEDULE, OR REVISE BY ADDING, DELETING, OR
TRANSFERING SUBSTANCES ON THE SCHEDULES IS AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
P-2-P is nowhere found or mentioned in the Utah Controlled
Substances Act, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, Section 5837-1 et seq.

The term "controlled substance11 is defined in two

places, Section 58-37-3 and 58-37-2 (4) (Appendix 14-19).

The

only basis that the State can claim that P-2-P is a controlled
substance is under the theory that it is a controlled substance
under the Federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. Section
801 et seq.

P-2-P is not specifically mentioned in the United

States Code, but, pursuant to rules and regulations of the United
States Attorney General, and their listing in the Code of Federal
Regulations at 21 CFR Section 1308.12 (g), it may be a controlled
substance under the Federal Act.

It is the Defendant's position

that the attempt to define the elements and punishment of a crime
by reference to the United States Code, or the Code of Federal
Regulations, promulgated pursuant to administrative rule making
by the Unites States Attorney General, constitutes an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority, and is

therefore not constitutionally valid and P-2-P is therefore not a
controlled substance under the Utah Controlled Substances Act.
It is respectfully submitted that there is a Utah Supreme
Court case directly on point, State vs„. Gallion 572 P.2d 683
(Utah 1977).

The case involved prosecution of the individual for

making a forged prescription for a controlled substance, Demerol.
At that time, Demerol was not a scheduled controlled substance
under the state statute, but had been scheduled by the Utah
Attorney General in acccordance with the Controlled Substance
Act.

The Utah Supreme Court held that that was improper, that

the Attorney General could not so schedule a substance not listed
in the legislative enactment, and that said action constituted an
unlawful and illegal delegation of legislative authority under
both the State and Federal Constitution.

The Court held such on

the basis of two separate but related arguments and concerns.
The first basis for the holding of the Court is expressed in
the first half of the opinion in that Article V Section 1 of the
Utah Constitution prohibits persons in the different branches of
government from exercising authority over another branch.

The

Utah Attorney General is part of the executive branch and
therefore a person who was specifically barred from exercising
legislative authority.

Thus, on that ground, as well as the

second ground, the Supreme Court held it was unconstitutional for
someone other than the legislature in that case to list a
controlled substance.
The Supreme Court however also based its decision on the
fact that the listing of a controlled substance under the Act,
thereby defining an element of and the punishment for a crime,

was an inherently legislative function that could not be
delegated to anyone.

The separate nature of this second point

was made explicit beginning at page 687 of the opinion, where the
court stated:
"The other aspect of this case which merits response is
whether the Controlled Substance Act has improperly
delegated legislative power."
The court held that the definition of a crime was an inherently
legislative function, which could not be delegated to anyone.
The court stated, at page 690:
"A determination of the elements of a crime and the
appropriate punishment therefore are, under our
Constitutional system, judgments, which must be made
exclusively by the legislature."
The Court discussed the Utah Controlled Substances Act and
the manner in which it worked, which has not changed
substantially since that time (with the exception of the
delegation to the Congress or United States Attorney General, as
discussed below).

The statute has a number of different

schedules, and defines the seriousness of various offenses
involving those substances based upon which schedule the
controlled substance is listed.

Thus, what might be a felony to

deal with a controlled substance under one schedule might be a
misdemeanor on another.

The Court discussed other jurisdictions

which had similarly held drug statutes unconstitutional and
distinguished the Federal case law which reached a decision
contrary to that reached by the Utah Court in Gal lion.

In

arriving at its conclusion and decision, the Court stated at page
689-90:

"In the Controlled Substances Act, the administrator
not only determines that a substance should be controlled,
he further schedules the substance, which in effect,
declares the magnitude of the penalty and fixes the
punishment. The administrator is exercising an essential
legislative function which cannot be transferred to him..."
"There are sound reasons for ruling the definition of a
crime and the precise punishment therefor to be an essential
legislative function, which cannot be transferred. Criminal
trials would be unduly complicated, for the defendant would
have the right to challenge the administrative procedure and
the findings where a substance has been scheduled or
rescheduled. A similar determination by the legislature
could not be challenged. The administrative rulings are not
statutes and are not incorporated into the code, a person
who wishes to abide by the law would have to resort to the
permanent register kept by the secretary of state to
determine the status of a substance."
G.ajJJjon involved the Utah State Attorney General .

The case

at bar involves the United States Congress, and pursuant to its
attempted delegation of authority, the United States Attorney
General in his adminstrative processes.

Therefore, there is no

way to successfully distinguish the present case from Gjj.H.ion,
su£.ra/ and therefore the attempted inclusion of P-2-P in the Utah
Act as a controlled substance is void and without effect as being
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.
Defendant notes that at least six states' highest appellate
courts (including Utah) have found their state's enactment of the
Controlled Substances Act an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power:

StaJbjL^^

379 So.2d 1084 (La.

1980); Howell v. State, 300 So.2d 774 (Miss. 1974); State v,
Kre.go, 433 N.E.2d 1298 (Ohio, 1981); State. v., Johnson, 173 N.W.2d
894 (S.D. 1970); and In Re Powell, 602 P.2d 711 (Wash. 1979).
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia found
that, pertaining to its drug statute, the adoption of future laws

(see below) of the federal government or its agencies is
unconstitutional as an unlawful delegation of legislative power
(State v. Grinstead, 206 S.E.2d 912 (W.Va. 1974).
In Howell, defendant was convicted of the possession of
amphetamines.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the

statute which delegated the power to the State Board of Health to
reschedule drugs was an unconstitutional delegation of the
legislatures power to define crimes and fix the punishment for
them, as well as a violation of the State Constitution's
separation of powers clause.

The State Board had transferred

amphetamines from a Schedule III drug to Schedule II, thus
increasing the penalties.
In Krego, an identical opinion resulted from a nearly
identical rescheduling of the drug phencyclidine, in Ohio.
In Powell, The Supreme Court of Washington, in reviewing a
detention for possession of the drug Dalmane, found the
legislative delegation to the State Board of Pharmacy
unconstitutional.
Generally, a state legislature cannot constitutionally
delegate its legislative powers to Congress or federal agencies.
Gallion appears to place Utah clearly in the group of states
prohibiting legislative delegation to Congress or federal
agencies or officers for the creation of serious crimes,
specifically.

Although there is some conflict, it is generally

held that the adoption by or under authority of a state statute
of prospective Federal legislation, or Federal administrative
rules thereafter to be passed, constitutes an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power.

A Maine statute declaring "intoxicating", within the meaning
of the act, any beverage containing a percentage of alcohol which
by federal enactment or U.S. Supreme Court decision was declared
to be an intoxicating beverage, was held invalid and an
abdication of the legislative function, in SJtate. v.. Int?xi.^
Liquors, 117 A 588 (Me. 1922).

State v. Gauthier, 118 A 380 (Me.

1922).
Legislative power was improperly delegated by a provision of
a state statute setting forth that the maximum periods of labor
in certain industries should be fixed by the State Department of
Labor to conform to the schedule established by federal
authorities, in H o^ga. t .^

B ashore, 200 A 672 (Pa.

1938).
I n Da r w eg e r ^

St a at.s , 196 NE 61 (N.Y. 1 9 3 5 ) , a state

statute required that agreements, codes, licenses, and rules
adopted by the Federal Government in pursuance of the National
Industrial Recovery Act were required to be filed, and, once a
Code of Fair Competition, as approved by the President of the
United States, had been filed, the standard of fair competition
in certain trades and industries would be determined by such
codes, rules, agreements, and regulations.
statute an unconstitutional

The court held the

delegation of legislative authority.

A state statute imposing a,n ii icoi ne tax equal to one-third of
the U.S. income tax for which the taxpayer was liable under the
act of Congress and I.R.S. regulations was held to adopt only the
act and regulations as they existed at the time of enactment of
the statute, and not to include future amendments or regulations,

and was hence not to be an invalid delegation of legislative
authority, in Santee Mills v. Query, 115 S.E. 20 2 (S.C. 192 2).
In Dawson_v

Hami..l.ton, 314 S.W.2d 532 (Ky. 1958), a statute

was passed establishing the standard time in Kentucky to be that
established by Act of Congress, or order of the Interstate
Commerce Commission.

The court held it to be an unconstitutional

abdication insofar as it "adopts time standards to be fixed in
the future."

(At 536, emphasis in original.)

A graduate of a foreign medical school applied for licensing
to practice medicine in Washington.

The previous statute allowed

licensing if the applicant graduated from a school maintaining a
standard equivalent to those prescribed by the American Medical
Association.

The statute under review required the school to be

on a list prepared by certain learned medical societies.

At the

time of enactment, the list did not yet exist, but was first
produced three years after enactment of the statute.

This was

held to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power,
in view of the future actions required at the time of enactment,
voided the statute.

Statev.Urquhart, 310 P.2d 261 (Wash.

1957) .
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in WaJJ,ac^
o.i...„.T.axaJtion, 184 N.W.2d 588 (Minn. 1971), held that the enactment
of a statute to the effect that the term "gross income" for state
income tax returns means adjusted gross income as computed for
federal income tax purposes did not and could not cause a
subsequently enacted federal statutory amendment, requiring a 30day waiting period before sick pay could be deducted from gross

income, to have force and effect on state law, since it was an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
In .S.eaI.e_v„,..„...McKermon, 336 P.2d 340 (Ore. 1959), a statute
requiring the Oregon State Department of Agriculture to adopt the
minimum regulations and laws of Unites States Department of
Agriculture, i.nter aljLa, was interpreted so as to avoid
unconstitutionality in legislative delegation.

Future

modifications of the federal laws and regulations were deemed not
to be included in the statute's direction.
Thus, it is seen that it has been widely held that a
legislature cannot delegate to Congress or a federal agency power
to create laws in the future.
Specifically, in the area of delegating future powers to
schedule and designate controlled substances, cases consistent
with the Utah position expressed in Ga.LLi.on are found in ..State y,
Johnson, 173 N.W.2d 894 (S.D. 1970) and in ^tjjte^v^. Rodr.!9..uez ,
379 So.2d 1084 (La. 1980), in which cases the state statutes
specifically included provisions for automatic inclusion of any
federally scheduled drug, and on that basis, the drug statute was
found an unconstitutional delegation.

In Johnson, the statute

prohibited sale of any drug which contained any quantity of
substance designated by regulations promulated under the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.

Defendant was charged with selling

LSD, which was not specified on the statute, other than by
reference to the federal act.

The court held, at 895:

"'Statutes adopting laws or regulations of other
states, the federal government, or any of its agencies,
effective at the time of adoption are valid, but attempted
adoption of future laws, rules or regulations of other
states, or of the federal government, or of its commission

and agencies generally have been held unconstitutional as an
unlawful delegation of legislative power. "' (Citations
omitted.)
"The statute does not adopt the regulations of the
federal government or one of its agencies at a given time,
but attempts to adopt any and all regulations and changes
therein promulgated under the federal act .in fujtujro ad
infinitum. This the legislature could not constitutionally
do"]'."
In Rodrigue..?./ supra/ the defendant was charged with
possession of Talwin.

The State Secretary of Department of

Health and Human Resources, pursuant to statute, added it to the
list of controlled substances days after the Drug Enforcement
Agency of the Department of
controlled substance.

Justice classified Talwin as a

The court held, at 1087:

"This prohibition against delegating the power to
create crimes applies not only to a delegation to a state
agency, such as the Deprtment of Health and Human Resources,
but to any other agency or body, such as the Drug
Enforcement Administration. The Louisiana legislature is
not authorized to delegate its legislative power to a
federal agency, nor to Congress."
Also, .Gri..nstead, s„upra, involved a conviction for
possession, delivery and sale of the drug LSD.

Until 1968, the

West Virginia legislature had not explicitly outlawed LSD, but in
1968, Congress amended the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act to include
LSD.

West Virginia's statute defined a "dangerous drug" as one

described under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.
Thereafter, the State Board of Pharmacy, with reference to the
federal act, declared LSD a dangerous drug.
Grinstead was indicted.

Subsequent to this,

The court held:

"The Legislature cannot delegate its authority to enact
criminal laws to an agency which is a unit of the exectutive
branch of State government, nor can it, under the guise of a
colorable delegation, permit the Board of Pharmacy to adopt

a federal law which has not been given prior approval by the
Legislature,"
The primary objection the G.ofl§iM§atsi court had to the delegation
was that it was a delegation to the federal government in futuro.
The Utah Controlled Substances Act went into effect on
January 1, 1972.

Laws 1971, Ch. 145.

On March 6, 1979, the

legislature passed an amendment to the Act, which went into
effect on May 8, 1979.

Laws 1979, Ch. 12.

The 1979 amendment

added the new Subsection (5) to Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
amended, 58-37-2, providing:
"The words "controlled substance" mean a drug,
substance or immediate precursor included in I, II, III, IV
or V or section 58-37-4. "Controlled substance" shall also
include a drug, substance, or immediate precursor included
in schedules I, II, III, IV or V of the Federal Contolled
Substances Act (Title II, P.L. 91-513), as such schedules
may be revised to add, delete or transfer substances from
one schedule to another, wherther by Congressional enactment
or by administrative rule of the United States Attorney
Genral adopeted pursuant to Section 201 of that act. The
words do not include distilled spirits, wine, or malt
beverages, as those terms are defined or used in Title 32,
tobacco or food."
Similar delegatory language also appears in the 1971
enactment, at 18(d) and 23.

That language has survived nearly

unchanged in our present 58-37-2(8)(d) aiuJ (16).
Subsections (2) and (3) of Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
amended, 58-37-3, were also added, in 1979:
"(2) All controlled substances listed in the Federal
Controlled Substances Act (Title II, P.L. 91-513), as it is
amended from time to time, are hereby controlled."
"(3) Whenever any substance is designated, rescheduled
or deleted as a controlled substance in schedules I, II,
III, IV or V of the Federal C ontrolled Substances Act (Title
II, P.L. 91-513), as such schedules may be revised by
Congressional enactment or by administrative rule of the
United States Attorney General adopted pursuant to section

201 of that act, that subsequent designation, rescheduling
or deletion shall govern."
These subsections survive basically unchanged in our present law.
P-2-P is not listed in the Utah Controlled Substance Act,
explicitly.
The Controlled Subtance Act (21 USCA 801 et seq.) was
enacted by Congress on October 27, 1970.

Section 811 (Appendix

20-4) sets forth the operative language for exercise of
delegations to the Attorney General.

Subsection (a) and (b)

provide a means by which the U.S. Attorney General may add,
transfer between schedules, or remove a drug from schedules.
First, he must request a scientific and medical evaluation, and
the Secretary's recommendations, from the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare (now Health and Human Services).

Then he

must make findings, and follow the federal rulemaking procedure.
However, 21 USCA 811(e) provides the U.S. Attorney General
may, with regard to "immediate precursors11, dispense with the
scientific and medical evaluations, the Secretary's
recommendations, findings, and the rulemaking procedures
altogether.

Since the requirement of findings is dispensed with,

the protective factors and guidelines of 21 USCA 811(c) are also
discarded.
On December 7, 1979, nine months after the Utah Legislature
amended Utah Code, Sec. 58-37-2, and 58-37-3, seven months after
they went into effect, and almost eight years after the initial
Utah enactment of 58-37-2 (which contained—in Subsection 23-references to the U.S. Attorney General making findings and
designations as to precursors), the U.S. Attorney General

designated P-2-P as a "precursor11, and amended Title 21, Section
1308.12, to add a new subsection "f", which caused P-2-P, also
known as phenylacetone, to be included in Schedule II of the
Federal Act.

The effective date of the criminal prohibition was

even later, February 11, 1980.
240, page 71824.

Federal Register, volume 44, No.

(Appendix, 25-27)

On May 1, 1986, the Attorney

General amended by mere renumbering the section 21 CFR 1308.12(f)
to (g). (Appendix, 28, 29.

Appendix 30 shows 21 CFR 1308.12 as

of the 4-1-79 revision, that is, without the subsection (f)--P-2P addition.

Appendix 31 and 32 show 21 CFR 1308.12 with the

addition of (f)--and P-2-P, which is the revision as of 4-1-80.)
Unquestionably, the Utah Legislature purportedly delegated
the power to the U.S. Attorney General in May 1979 (or earlier)
of making future additions to the controlled substance schedules,
and P-2-P was added by the Attorney General subsequent to the
delegation by the Utah Legislature, on December 7, 1979,
effective February 11, 1980.
de 1 egation l.n_Jjitj^

As such, it was a purported

i.BJllilJL\MP, and unconstitutiona 1 .

Defendant raised these issues pre-trial (Rl 30-45) and at
the end of the State's evidence, when Defendant moved for a
directed verdict (R2 425), but they were denied (Rl 45, R2 432o j .

POINT V:
THE AUTHORITY GIVEN THE U.S. CONGRESS OR U.S. ATTORNEY
GENERAL UNDER THE UTAH CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT TO
DESIGNATE, RESCHEDULE, OR REVISE BY ADDING, DELETING, OR
TRANSFERING SUBSTANCES ON THE SCHEDULES IS A DEPRIVATION OF
DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS TO REASONABLE NOTICE OF
PROSCRIBED CONDUCT
The Utah Supreme Court, in Gal lion, observed, at 690:

"The adminsitrative rulings are not statutes and are not
incorporated into the code, a person who wishes to abide by
the law would have to resort to the permanent register kept
by the secretary of state to determine the status of a
substance."
Since the delegation is to the U.S. Attorney General, the burden
to a person of average intelligence is complicated, by requiring
that person to follow the very complicated workings of the
Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulations, in addition
to the Utah statute.

A person is not given fair notice that his

contemplated conduct is prohibited by statute.

Defendant, in

being charged with and convicted of violation of a statute so
convoluted in its means of providing notice to the world, is
deprived of due process.

A crime so difficult to learn of is in

a serious sense confusing and vague.

Looking to the Utah statute

for guidance, a person would not find P-2-P, and would only find
vague words such as "controlled substance".

Gxlnsjte.ad, ..ibid, at

915, and 918, alludes to this problem, but is unclear as to
whether i t

i s a ratj.jo djec.endisj .

jSJtjaJbja v ^ J.ohns„qn , 17 3 N . W . 2d

8 9 4 , at 8 9 5 , a l l u d e s t o i t , i n p a s s i n g .

In . S t a .t e v\ D o u g a, .1.1., 57 0

P.2d 137 (Wash), at 138, the court concluded:
"[i]t is unreasonable to expect an average person to
continually research the Federal Register to adetermine what
draugs are controlled substances under RCW 69.50."
His Honor, Judge Low, having heard the evidence, commented on the
problem (R2 431-2) :
"I think it's a disconcerting issue. As to notice and
fairness, I am aware the language in the G.a.LLiori case which
raises that concern and issue. And I suppose it's most
bothersome to the court, to the defendant's ability to be
put on notice of changes in the federal legislation by the
method prescribed in the federal legislation. And the
defendant's or any defendant's ability to become aware of
those kind of changes."

G.aiJ.1011, at 688, cites the preference in Utah for crimes to
be stated :i i: 1 the state statutes:
"In State v. Johnson (44 Utah 18, 26, 137 P. 632
(1913)) this court held that under the Constitution, the
courts may not denounce and punish as crimes acts and
omissions not made punishable by statute, for it is a
legislative power to declare acts as crimes and to prescribe
proper penalties."
"The consititutional standard set forth in State v.
j[..giinson is incorporated in the Utah Criminal Code. Section
Y^I'i-iOS,
as enacted in 1973, amended 1974, provides:"
"Common law crimes are abolished and no conduct is
a crime unless made so by this code, other applicable
statute or ordinance."
Defendant raised this issue in his motion for directed
verdict (R2-426), and pre-trial (Rl 30-45), but it was denied (Rl
45, R2 432-3).
POINT VI:
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE THE JURY INSTRUCTION THAT
THE STATE HAD THE BURDEN OF PROVING THE PROPRIETY OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE FOR SCHEDULING THE TO-BE-CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE
In Ga11ion, at 68 9, the Court held:
"There are sound reasons for ruling the definition of a
crime and the precise punishment therefor to be essential
legislative functions, which cannot be transferred.
Criminal trials would be unduly complicated, for the
defendant would have the right to challenge the
administrative procedure and the findings where a substance
has been scheduled or rescheduled."
Defendant tendered Jury Instruction No. 1 to the court
(Appendix, 33, 34), in compliance with this holding in Gallion.
It simply set forth the pertinent requirements of 21 USCA 811.
The court declined to give the instruction, and counsel for
Defendant stated his objections to the failure (R2 518-9).
Further, counsel for Defendant objected to the giving of
Instruction No. 5 (Appendix, 35, R2 521), which implicitly and

erroneously assumes the premise of what the jury would have been
required to find, viz. that P-2-P was a controlled substance.
Nonetheless, the court gave instruction No. 5.

As a result, the

Defendant was denied the right to "challenge the administrative
procedure and the findings" (GalJJjm, ibi.d. at 689), to his
serious prejudice.
j£^j£iJ!i§.i M on

Therefore, on its face the affidavit in support of the
warrant does not contain sufficient probable cause to believe
that the defendant was actively engaged in criminal activity,
based further upon the fact that certain information should be
excised and certain added to the warrant, and based upon the
staleness of the information in the affidavit, the evidence
gathered should be suppressed.
Further, the informant in this case, was a government
employee or agent, or acted with the requisite frame of mind and
by the requisite means to be treated as acting as a government
agent, and acted with serious culpable conduct. Therefore, his
actions should fall under the governance of the Fourth Amendment,
and, obviously, be suppressed.
Additionally, due to the destruction of the chemical
evidence by the State, without full sampling, all chemical
evidence should have been suppressed, and, at least, the State
should1ve been barred from alluding to any other chemicals other
than those few sampled.

Due to the prejudice created, directed

verdict should've been granted.
Since Utah has already decided that delegations of
leaislative power to define felony crimes pertaining to

controlled substances, and to fashion punishments therefore, is
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, and since
the addition of P-2-P was done after the enactment of the
statute, the incorporation of P-2-P into the Utah statute was
unconstitutional, as a delegation, and worse, as a delegation in
jE.^.yxo_aLd ij^iniJtjiOT.
The convoluted means of incorporating future laws, as was
used in the purported enactment of the P-2-P inclusion, fails to
give notice to persons, sufficient to assure their due process
rights, and as such is vague and confusing.
The failure of the court to give the instruction on proof of
proper enactment of the P-2-P scheduling, by the Attorney
General, deprived Defendant of due process.
Wherefore, Defendants asks the court to reverse the judgment
and conviction, and remand for a dismissal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day. Of August ,-> I§89 .

DANIEL R. KNOWLTON
Attorney for
Defendant and Appellant
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JON J- BUNDERSON
BOX ELDER COUNTY ATTORNEY
45 North First East
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Telephone: (801) 734-9464
IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT, BRIGHAM CITY DEPARTMENT
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
\

IN RE:
THE INVESTIGATION OF AN
ILLEGAL DRUG LABORATORY

\
\
\

AFFIDAVIT REQUESTING
ISSUANCE OF
SEARCH WARRANT
Criminal No.

Comes now MIKE JOHNSON, being first duly sworn on his
oath in this natter, and swears and deposes as follows:
1.

Your affiant is a Peace Officer with fourteen

(14) years of Law Enforcement experience, currently employed
by the Box Elder County Sheriff's Office.
2.

Your affiant has worked Drug and Controlled Substance

Investigations for over five (5) years, during which years
your affiant has been involved in over one hundred (100)
drug investigations involving: Illegal Possession of Controlled
Substances, Illegal Distribution of Controlled Substances,
Cultivation of Controlled Substances, and Manufacturing
of Controlled Substances.
3.

Your affiant has been trained in the investigation

of drug cases as follows:
Utah P.O.S.T. basic training on Drug Enforcement
and Identification.
1-day school on Clandestine Lab Cases, Instruction
by Utah P.O.S.T.
3-day school on Clandestine Labs presented by D.E.A.

1-day school on Clandestine Drug Manufacturing.
1-week seminar on Drug and Lab Investigations presented
by the Institute for Law and Justice, Inc.
2-week national D.E.A. seminar covering most areas
of Drug Investigations.
4.

On June 29th, 1988, a confidential informant

(hereinafter referred to as CI) met with your affiant.

The

CI told your affiant of what he believed to be a Clandestinetype Lab producing an illegal substance located at a residence
in Perry, Utah, which does not have a street address to
the knowledge of your affiant.

The residence is described

and known to your affiant as the Bob Wendel Home, located
across the highway from the Walker Cinema, east of said
highway approximately one-fourth (J) to one-half ($) mile.
5.

The CI described the area within the residence

where the lab is located as being in the front earage,
with

various chemicals stored in other parts of the residence.

The CI further described tubes running to the outside
of the residence from the front garage area, and the CI
described various equipment and glassware upon the premises
as follows:
a.

Heating mantles.

b.

Vessels.

e

Flasks.

d.

Vacuum Pumps.

e.

Electric Stirrers.

f

Filtering Funnels.

c

Vacuum Distillation Apparatus.

1

Reaction Apparatus.

-2-

6.

i.

Reflex Condensors.

j.

Thermometers.

The CI told your affiant that he had personally

seen the following chemicals in the residence,
a.

Nitric Acid.

b.

Sulphuric Acid.

c.

Sodium Acetate.

d.

Ether.

e.

Other unnamed chemicals in their containers.

The CI told your affiant that he read the labels 011 ttlose
chemicals which, he could name.
7.

The CI told your affiant that he has personally

been in the residence on numerous occasions, between the
dates of January, 1986 and April 22, 1988, and his descriptions
given to the affiant are based upon his personal obser /ations
while upon the residence premises or within the residence.
8.

The CI told your affiant that the occupant of

the residence, James Alvin Douglas, diives an International
make vehicle, which the CI saw was registered to Dodglas1
girlfriend, who lives in Park City, Utah.
9

ITif1 CI told your affiant that the residence is

occupied by a man known to the CI as James Alvin Douglas.
The CI described the residence location as noted abi»Vf«
a

-lescri--: the premises as consisting of a

white brick house located in the midst of an orchard in
Perrj , Utal i, with outbuildings and wi th three (3) German
Shepherd dogs living upon the premises.
10.

The CI further told your affiant that Douglas
-3-

told him that the International vehicle used by him (Douglas)
is specially equipped with a turbocharger and with extra
gas tanks so that the same can travel approximately twelve
hundred (1200) miles non-stop.
11-.

The CI told your affiant that the phone number

on the telephone of the residence was 734-2747.
12.

The CI provided your affiant with a physical

description of the target, James Alvin Douglas, and described
his as follows:
black hair, black
13.

5'11", medium to heavy build, balding,
mustache, often wears a western hat.

The CI told your affiant that he smelled a strong,

chemical smell on August 8th, 1988, while near the residence
(but not on the premises), and that on an earlier date
he had smelled the same odor while on the road near the
premises.
14.

The above information was provided directly

to the affiant by the CI, or was provided by the CI to
Detective Lynn Yeates of the Box Elder County Sheriff's
Office.

Detective Yeates has, in turn, provided the information

he has received to your affiant in the context of the
joint employment of your affiant and Lynn Yeates with
the Box Elder County Sheriff's Office.
15.

Your affiant considers the information received

from the CI to be reliable because the CI is a member
of the local community in good standing, is known to your
affiant to be a reliable person, and is believed to be
assisting law enforcement as a good member of the community
with no claim for reward or legal favor nor any promise
-4-

of the same.
16.

Your affiant has verified the above information

provided by the CI to be correct and accurate through
the following independent investigation:
a.

Detective Lynn Yeates spoke with Art Terkelson,

who is a qualified Criminalist at the Weber State Crime
Laboratory in Ogden, Utah.

Yeates described the equipment,

glassware, and chemicals to Terkelson, and Terkelson stated
that the type of equipment and glassware present (as described
herein above) and the named chemicals (described herein
above) were all consistent with the type of equipment
and chemicals used to produce Methamphetamine or a substance
known as Phenyl-2-Propanoneb.

Methamphetamine and Phenyl-2-Propanone are

controlled substances under the Utah Controlled Substances
Act, and your affiant is informed and believes that it
is illegal to produce or possess the same without the
proper licenses.
c.

Your affiant has spoken with Kim Kail of

the Utah Narcotics and Liquor Law Enforcement Division
and is informed that upon investigation, James Alvin Douglas
does not possess a license from the State of Utah which
would allow him to either possess or produce Methamphetamine
or Phenyl-2-Propanone.
d.

Your affiant has personally travelled to

the residence, without entering the private property,
and examining merely what is available to see from the
public roadway, has discovered the home to be a white
brick house, surrounded bv an

^T-^K^^-^

T^^^^^J

~- * %. -

approximate location described by the CI*

Your affiant

observed three (3) German Shepherd dogs upon the premises.
e.

Your affiant nas conducted surveillance

of the premises, without entering the premises, and has
seen a male individual leave and/or return to the premises.
This male individual fits the description given by the
CI of the person known as James Alvin Douglas, to wit,
the individual is approximately 5 feet 11 inches, has
a medium to heavy build, is balding, has black hair, and
a black mustache.
f.

Lynn Yeates has told your affiant that he

has seen the said male individual and has noted that he
was wearing a western hat during his surveillance of the
premises•
g.

Your affiant has personally observed, through

surveillance, an International make vehicle driven by
the male occupant of the premises, bearing License Plate
Number Utah, 309 BHJ.

Upon checking this License Number

with the Utah Motor Vehicle Division, your affiant discovered
that the same is registered to one Sharon L. Carbine<
Box 19 64, Park City, Utah-.
h.

Your affiant has observed a female driving

another vehicle, License Plate Number 807 CBE, said vehicle
also registered to the same Sharon L. Carbine at P.O.
Box 1864, Park City, Utah.

This female has been observed,

through surveillance, leaving and/or travelling to the
above described premises, and has been observed to stay
there overnight on at least one occasion.

i.

Through surveillance, your affiant and Detective

Sergeant Ken Adams followed

Douglas

and the female

described above, who is believed to be Sharon L. Carbine,
and in a public parking lot your affiant and Sgt. Adams
walked by the International vehicle driven by the target.
Your affiant observed, without the aid of artificial illumination
or other artificial means, that the said International
vehicle is equipped with what appears to be auxiliary
gas tanks.
k.

This occurred on July 28th, 1988.
Your affiant is aware from his training,

and is also informed by Art Terkelson, that the manufacture
of Phenyl-2-Propanone and Methamphetamine creates a strong
odor, and that Phenyl-2-Propanone is a precursor of Methamphetamine
in the said manufacturing process.
17.

All observations resulting from surveillance

noted herein occurred between the dates of June 29th,
1988 and September 1st, 1988.
DATED this

day of

September

, 1988.

MIKE JOHNSON, AFFIANT
NOTARY SEAL:
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
September

day of

_, 1988.

ROBERT W. DAINES, CIRCUIT JUDGE

IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT, BRIGHAM CITY DEPARTMENT
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF BOX ELDER

)
) ss
)

DEPOSITION AND AFFIDAVIT
OF MIKE JOHNSON IN SUPPORT
OF AND PETITION FOR
SEARCH WARRANT

Personally appeared before me this
day of September,
1988, the deponent and affiant herein, MIKE JOHNSON, a peace
officer, who, on oath, deposes and says that he has and there
is probable and reasonable cause to believe, and that he does
believe, that there is now (on the premises) (in the vehicle)
(on the person of) located at and also described as:
The premises known as the Bob Wendel Home, located in Perry, Utah,
across the highway from the Walker Cinema, east of said highway
approximately one-fourth (i) to one-half (\) of a mile,
consisting of a wnite brick house located in the midst of an
orchard, with various out-buildings and three (3) German
Shepherd dogs living upon the premises; a vehicle described
as an International, bearing License Plate Number 309 BHJ, Utah;
the person of an individual known as JAMES ALVIN DOUGLAS;
the following personal property or evidence, to wit:
Illegal drugs, including particularly Phenyl-2-Propanone or
Methamphetamine, chemicals and equipment used to manufacture
Phenyl-2-Propanone and/or Methamphetamine, including but not
limited to tubes, equipment, glassware, heating mantels, vessels,
flasks, vacuum pumps, electric stirrers, filtering funnels,
vacuum distilation apparatus, reaction apparatus, reflex condensors
thermometers, and various chemicals, including but not limited
to Nitric Acid, Sulphuric Acid, Sodium Acetate, Ether, and
other unnamed chemicals in their containers.
Your deponent and affiant says that there is probable
and reasonable cause to believe that the said property
or evidence:
(X)
(X)
(X)

is unlawfully acquired or unlawfully possessed.
has been used as a means of committing a public offense.
is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means
of committing or concealing a public offense.
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct.
( ) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a party
to the illegal conduct.

Your affiant says chat the tacts in support of the issuance of the
search warrant are as follows: AS SPECIFIED IN THE AFFIDAVIT REQUESTING
ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANT ATTACHED HERETO AND BY THIS REFERENCE MADE A PART HERBQ

?«qqyxxgj5^KK?twxxteeoxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxgW'Xifflac^aKKX
XXXXXXXJraXKy^XM^l^-X^XkKXKSteXayXOCiX^XiCjKXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

3^XK?KMKXX«Xt<XXX>^XK*X*tfXK#*^
3£&*X9S«XXXttC«X&i^X»}tXX
QtXXXKX3tfgXdfcXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX9CXXXXX?«XaC^ff8a^XjCXXXX

xxKxjgcxjodfc&^Xxto^
feeiHXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XYYXYXYYyyyyyXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XYXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

4«x*^^xxaaa*xK}at^KJ»wxK8Beofixx9tKxxicKMxxKJ«^
&^Xl<$K)iX^*^X^ii^w^XSet^A^i>t^XK^-X.-XXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Your affiant has reasonable cause to believe that grounds for the
issuance of a search warrant exist, based upon the aforementioned information,
facts and circumstances.
WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the
seizure of said items in the daytime and that the same be brought before this
magistrate.

XXXBK^XXXK^XXXtMXXK^
XXXK&XXXX^XXXX^^XX^XKX^^KX^
XKX^^XKt^XXX&S^X>2i^^

It is further requested that, if appropriate, the officer executing the
requested warrant not be required to give notice of his authority or purpose
because:
( ) This paragraph is not appropriate to this case and such authority
is not requested.
(x)

The property sought is a narcotic, illegal drug, or other similar
substance which may be easily and quickly destroyed or disposed
of.

( )

Physical harm may result to a person if such notice is given
because:

MIKE JOHNSON
Affiant

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

day of

September ,19

Judge, ROBERT W. DAINES
In the

FIRST CIRCUIT

Court of

Box Elder County, State of Utah.
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MIKE
JCHNSON
* "h ve J S p r o b a b l e ar d r e a s o n a b l e cause for
the i s s u a n c e of the s e a r c h waf'iP.L as s e t for>h ] n ' h e a f f : d a * t t a t t a c h e d
h e r e t o and made a p a r t h e r e o f as if f u l l y s e t f o r t h h e r e i n ; you a r e , t h e r e f o r e ,
comroanded to made immediate .search (in the daytime) XXK>a^XXX3feXJiXXSf-^xaX9C
XKXX^XX>^K^X«X^^
(of the preir-iscs) (in a v e h i c l e )
(on the person of) l o c a t e d a t and a l s o d e s c r i b e d a s :
7 h e p r e m i s e s known
a s t h e S o b W e n d e l Home, l o c a t e d i n P e r r y , U t a h , a c r o s s t h e h i g h w a y
from t h e W a l k e r C i n e m a , e a s t of s a i d h i g h w a y a p p r o x i m a t e l y o n e - f o u r t h
t o o n e - h a l f (J) m i l e , c o n s i s t i n g of a w h i t e b r i c k h o u s e l o c a t e d i n
Lhii^j^lAsl^^l^^ri^^JiJiQhArd
v a r i o u s o u t - b u i l d i n g s a n d t h r e e (3)
t with
German S h e p h e r d d o g s l i v i n g u p o n t h e p r e m i s e s ; a v e h i c l e d e s c r i b e d
Sii- a J? I n t e r n a t i o n a l , b e a r i n g L i c e n s e P l a t e Number 3 0 9 5 H J , U t a h ;
t h e p e r s o n of an i n d i v i d u a l known as JAMES ALVTN DOUGLAS;
the f o l l o w i n g p e r s o n a l p r o p e r l y or e v i d e n c e , t c - w i t : I l l e g a l d r u g s , i n c l u d i n g
p a r L i c u l a r l y P h e n y l - 2 - P r o p a n o n e o r M e t h a m p h e t a m i n e , cTTemicals a n d
equipment used t o manufacture P h e n y l - 2 - P r o p a n o n e and/or Methamphetamine
i n c l u d i n g but not l i m i t e d to t u b e s , equipment, g l a s s w a r e , heating mante
v e s s e l s , f l a s k s , vacuum pumps, e l e c t r i c s t i r r e r s , f i l t e r i n g
funnels,
vacuum d i s t i l a t i o n a p p a r a t u s , r e a c t i o n a p p a r a t u s , r e f l e x c o n d e n s e r s ,
t h e r m o m e t e r s , and v a r i o u s c h e m i c a l s , i n c l u d i n g b u t n o t l i m i t e d t o
N i t r i c A c i d , S u l p h u r i c Acid, Sodium A c e t a t e , E t h e r , and o t h e r unnamed
chenjicals a n t h e i r c o n t a i n e r s ,
« ^
„ ,, „
and i ? you find the same or any p a r t t h e r e o f , X^J^XX^XXXXaS^XIKftXSXKtaf
X0CXt!4XXX^:t*XXX>iXl$XX«XXlXK«0fiX^ ( t o r e t a i n and keep i t s a f e l y \ inti ] f u r t h e r
o r d e r of the c o u r t ) .
uivcn ui'dt'i riM, hand and dated t h i s

day of

September

JUDGE , ROBERT W. DAINES

,, 1988 .

Proof" under oath ! laving been presented to the satisf action of tl ic
magistrate that the foregoing search warrant which h a s been issued, is
for a narcotic or illegal drug or otf icr similar substance wliich m a y be
easily and quickly destroyed or disposed o f , or that physical harm
may result to any person if notice is g i v e n , y o u are hereby authorized to
execute this search warrant without first luiocking or in any way disclosing
y o u r s e l f , y o u r authority, or y o u r purpose.

J! JDGE , RC 'BE? .T i i

PAGE 2 — Search Warrant
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'." ~ l a - 4 .

UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

>«j>^« --in iu,.*-*.-!*• wiiiv *-i

^ 'Special function officers ' means persons performing specialized investigations, service of legal process, or security functions. These officers include
state military police, constables, port of entry officers, school district security
officers, fire arson investigators for any political subdivision of the state,
airport security officers of any airport owned or operated by the state or any of
its political subdivisions, railroad special agents deputized by a county sheriff
under Section 17-30-2, and all other persons designated hv <tnu^>> -v: u a v - peace officer authority.
(2) (a) Special function officers have peace officer aurr.'-r/,;.
while en
gaged in the duties of their respective employment, and not ior the pur
pose of general law enforcement. Where the officer is charged with security functions respecting facilities or property, the powers may be exercised only in connection with acts occurring on the property where the
officer is employed or when required for the protection of the employ* - 'interest, property, or employees.
(b) Airport security officers have total peace officer authority w;..-r
duty and when acting in relation to the responsibilities of the airport ,it
which they are employed, providing that the powers may be exercise i
only in connection with acts occurring on the property of the airport
(c) Special function officers may carry firearms only if authorized and
under conditions as specified by the officer's employer or chief administrator. The carrying of firearms by constables is authorized onh »vrnje flare engaged in the duties of their employment.
(3) fa) A special function officer may not exercise the authority of a pea<.e
<\r until the officer has satisfactorily completed an approved basic
i-j.umng program for special function officers as provided under Subsection *3Kb) and the chief law enforcement officer or administrator h.
certified this fact to the director of the Division of Peace Officer Standard
and Training. City and county constables and their deputies shall cert \:
their completion of training to the county commissioner of * u ^ roujv
they serve.
(b) The agency [that] the special function officer serves shah establiMi
and maintain a basic special function course and in-service training programs as approved by the director of the Division of Peace Officer Standards and Training with the advice and consent of the Council on Peace
Officer Standards and Training. The training shall consist of MO fewer
than 40 hours per year, to be conducted by the agency's own atai: or .•; N-r
agencies.
History: C. 1953, 77-la-4, e n a c t e d by L.
1985, ch. 174, § 3; 1987, ch. 203, § 2.
C o m p i l e r ' s Notes. — The 1987 amendment
inserted "port of entry officers" and substituted
"Section 17-30-2" for "Section 17-22-2" in the
second sentence in Subsection (1); designated
the formerly undesignated paragraph in Subsection (2) as Subsection (2Kb), redesignating
former Subsection (2Kb) as present Subsection

(2Hc); inserted "the Division of" preceding
"Peace Officer Standards and Training" in
Subsections (3Ha) and <3)(b); and made minorstylistic changes throughout the section.
Laws 1987, ch. 203, § 3 provides: "It is understood that a normal transition period shall
be allowed to effect the transfers (of the operation of ports of entry to the highway patrol |."
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• r .met'.
• ^i.uact as deimeo ,.i :JU • oae of ethics adopted and published by h*' National Association of S«.» in! Wnrtnrc
H*sue~\. i >"•
. . *».* - '• mil.
<
32, § 6; 1985, ch. 187, & 78; 1987, eh. 27, § 9.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1987 amendment substituted "licensee" for "person" in the
first sentence in the introductory paragraph,

i it-ii uinicni social worker" and "or as a
member of any other health care profession" in
Subsection (3), inserted
'•1-'" !n Subsection
(4), and made other n,,i,ui uianges.

CHAPTER 37
CONTROLLED SI T I«*'\N<T^
Sunset Act.
1997.

Section f»3-~

"lie ~)8 is terminated on .1 * ** 1,

- :| l.'i

Section
iSrt-.'iT-'J.S.

58-37-4.

58-37-6.

58.37-1.

Practices of non-allopathic practitioners, herbalists, and massage therapists and use of herbs
and food supplements of vegetable origin not restricted.
Schedules of controlled substances — Schedules I through
V — Findings required — Specific substances included in
schedules,
License to manufacture, produce,
distribute, dispense, administer, or conduct research — Issu-

58-37-8.
58-37-9.
58-37-10.

58
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Mill1

ance by department — Denial,
suspension, or revocation —
Records required — Prescriptions.
Prohibited acts — Penalties.
Investigators -— Status of peace
officers.
Search warrants —- Administrative inspection warrants — Inspections and seizures of property without warrant.
Property subject to forfeiture Seizure — Procedure.
.In.t..-

.;,,.-.*M*><i S u b s t a n c e s Act."
COLLA FERAL INFERENCES

A.L.R. — When may offender found guilty of
multiple crimes under Comprehensive Y) un
Abuse Prevenlion and Control Ait of 1970 eji

58-37-2.

KSCS ^ 841-851) be punished for nir.l, .»iw -ffense M) A L.R. Fed. 794.

Definitions.

As used in. this chapter:
(1) "Administer" means the direct application ^\ A -^orr^iien substance, whether hy injection, inhalation, m^esti.-u. •* s i* --'her n c m s , to
the body of a patient or research subject b\
(a) a practitioner or, in his presence, by his authorized agent; or
(b) the patient or research subject at the direction and in the presence of the practitioner,
(2) "Agent" means an authorized person who ,nr.
> -..* ->i'or at the
direction of a manufacturer, distributor, or practit;
.••**, r.oes not include a common or contract earner, ouhi- ^arehou.-oman or employee of
any of them.
(3) "Control" means to add, remove, or change the placement of a drug,
substance, or immediate precursor under Section. 58-37-3,
239
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(4) v uu. • •
e means a drug, substance, or immediate precursor include'.
-es I, II, III, IV, or V of Section 58-37-4, and also
includes a drug substance, or unrnediate precursor included in schedules
I, II, III, IV, or V of the federal Controlled Substances Act, Title II, P.L
91-513, as those schedules may be revised to add, delete, or transfer substances from one schedule to another, wl lether by Congressional enactment or by administrative 1 n tit> of the IJnited States Attorney General
adopted under Section 201 of that act. Controlled substance does not
include distilled spirits, wine, or malt beverages, as those terms are de
fined or used in Title 32A, regarding tobacco or food,
( 5 ) '' ( ! t»i i 1111 * i" 11 • 11. i 1111»i: ; 111111 * t%

in < * a 11 s:

(a) aily substance or container or labeling of any substance that
without authorization bears the trademark, trade name, or other
identifying mark, imprint, number, device, or any likeness of them,
of a manufacture i r, distributor, or dispenser other than the person or
persons who in fact manufactured, distributed, or dispensed the substance which falsely purports to be a controlled substance distributed
by, any other manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser; or
(b) any substance that is represented to be a controlled substance
(6) "Deliver" or "delivery" means the actual, constructive, or attempted
transfer of a controlled substance or a listed chemical, whether or not an
agency relationship exists
(7) "Department" means the Department of Commerce.
(8.) "Depressant or stimulant substance" means:
la) a drug which contains any quantity of
(i) barbituric acid or any of the salts ot Darn
(ii) any derivative of barbituric acid which ho
nated by the secretary as habit-forming under Sectic
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Aft .21 r ^
(b) a drug which contains any quantity o!
(i) amphetamine or any of its optica) isomers;
(ii) any salt of amphetamine or anv salt of an ov\ • i' amphetamine; or
(iii) any substance which tl le Secretary ot n
Services or the Attorney General of the Unite
vestigation has found and by regulation designated habi;
ing because of its stimulant <;ffect on the ^ n t r n i *-.,.-.•-.->-• ^ ^
or
(c) lysergic acid diethylamide;
(d)

i111y (J i*u g w h i c h c o n t a i n s a n y q u a i 11 i ty < > i ; i s u b s t a nce wh i c h the

Secretary of Health and Human Services or the Attorney General of
the United States after investigation has found to have, and by regulation designated as having, a potential for abuse because of its depressant or stimulant effect on the central nervous system or its
hallucinogenic effect.
(9) "Dispense" or "prescribe" means the delivery of a controlled substance by a pharmacist to an ultimate user pursuant to the lawful order of
a practitioner, and includes distributing to, leaving with, giving away, or
it posing of that substance as well as the packaging, labeling, or compel inding nen \ssarv t n nnMV»r*» t h.» - • - Kstanee for de 1 ivery.
240
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i
t . ..3i:naci , -A I.> dispenses a controlled substance.
(11) "Distribute" means to deliver oiher than i»v administering or dispensing a controlled substance or a listed chemical
(12) "Distributor" means a person who .':-;* -••v^s'
stances.
(13) "Drug" means:
(a) articles recognized in the official United States Pharmacopoeia,,
Official Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States, or Official
National Formulary, or any supplement to any of them;
(b) articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation,
treatment, or prevention of disease m man or other animals;
(c) articles, other than food, intended to afTVt ' h e struct1.;*-*
function of man or other animals and
(d) articles intended for use as a comi; rant oi any . *
-pen
fied in Subsection (a), (b), or (c); but dn.^ - f -icludt- i
•
*] >••*
mmponents, parts, or accessories
5 Drug dependent person" means ai ly individual who unlawfully
md habitually uses any controlled substance to endanger the public
*w*~als, health, safety, or welfare, or who is so dependent upon the use of
•rolled substances as to have lost the power of self-control with refer
-nee to his dependency.
(151 "Food" means:
m* ,mv nutrient or substance of plant, mineral. .: ^.wina* origin
Than a drug as specified in this chapter, and normally ingested
.;man beings; and
(hi foods for special dietary uses as exist by reason of a physical,
physiological, pathological, or other condition including but not limited to the conditions of disease, convalescence, pregnancy, lactation,
allergy, hypersensitivity to food, underweight, and overweight; uses
for supplying a particular dietary need which exist by reason of age
ncluding but not limited to the ages of infancy and childbirth, and
also uses for supplementing and for fortifying the ordinary or unlsual diet with any vitamin, mineral, or other dietary property for
^e of a food. Any particular use of a food is a special dietarv H ^
regardless of the nutritional purposes.
' 16' "Immediate precursor" means a substance which the
OTipral of the United States has found to be, and by regulnti*
a ted as being, the principal compound used or produced <
-e in the manufacture of a controlled substance, or which it> *.
ite chemical intermediary used or likely to be used in the manui
. controlled substance, the control of which is necessary to prevent > m L or limit the manufacture of the controlled substance.
'Manufacture" means the production, preparation, propagation,
unaing, or processing of a controlled substance, either directly or
cti\ by extraction from substances of natural origin, or indepeniciitiv by means of chemical synthesis or by a combination of extraction
md chemical synthesis.
•IS) "Manufacturer" includes any person who packages, repackages, or
labels anv -^ nt;nner of any controlled suhManre. ox^opt pharmacists who
2 41
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dispense or compound prescription orders for delivery to the ultimate
consumer.
(19) "Marijuana" means all species of the genus Cannabis and all parts
of the genus, whether growing or not; the seeds of it; the resin extracted
from any part of the plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds, or resin. The term
does not include the mature stalks of the plant, fiber produced from the
stalks, oil or cake made from the seeds of the plant, any other compound,
manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the mature
stalks, except the resin extracted from them, fiber, oil or cake, or the
sterilized seed of the plant which is incapable of germination. Any synthetic equivalents of the substances contained in the plant Cannabis sativa or any other species of the genus Cannabis which are chemically
indistinguishable and pharmacologically active are also included.
(20) "Money" means officially issued coin and currency of the United
States or any foreign country.
(21) "Narcotic drug" means any of the following, whether produced
directly or indirectly by extraction from substances of vegetable origin, or
independently by means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of
extraction and chemical synthesis:
(a) opium, coca leaves, and opiates;
(b) a compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, or preparation of
opium, coca leaves, or opiates;
(c) opium poppy and poppy straw; or
(d) a substance, and any compound, manufacture, salt, derivative,
or preparation of the substance, which is chemically identical with
any of the substances referred to in Subsection (a), (b), or (c), except
narcotic drug does not include decocainized coca leaves or extracts of
coca leaves which do not contain cocaine or ecgonine.
(22) "Negotiable instrument" means documents, containing an unconditional promise to pay a sum of money, which are legally transferable to
another party by endorsement or delivery.
(23) "Opiate" means any drug or other substance having an addictionforming or addiction-sustaining liability similar to morphine or being
capable of conversion into a drug having addiction-forming or addictionsustaining liability.
(24) "Opium poppy" means the plant of the species Papaver somniferum L., except the seeds of the plant.
(25) "Person" means any corporation, association, partnership, trust,
other institution or entity or one or more individuals.
(26) "Poppy straw" means all parts, except the seeds, of the opium
poppy, after mowing.
(27) "Possession" or "use" means the joint or individual ownership,
control, occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, obtaining,
or the application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption, as
distinguished from distribution, of controlled substances and includes individual, joint, or group possession or use of controlled substances. For a
person to be a possessor or user of a controlled substance, it is not required that he be shown to have individually possessed, used, or controlled the substance, but it is sufficient if it is shown that he jointly
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participated with one or more persons in the use, possession, or control of
any substances with knowledge that the activity was occurring.
(28) "Practitioner" means a physician, dentist, veterinarian, pharmacist, scientific investigator, pharmacy, hospital, or other person licensed,
registered, or otherwise permitted to distribute, dispense, conduct research with respect to, administer, or use in teaching or chemical analysis
a controlled substance in the course of professional practice or research in
this state.
(29) "Proceeds" means whatever is received when an object is sold,
exchanged, or otherwise disposed of.
(30) "Production" means the manufacture, planting, cultivation, growing, or harvesting of a controlled substance.
(31) "Securities" means any stocks, bonds, notes, or other evidences of
debt or of property.
(32) "State" means Utah.
(33) "Ultimate user" means any person who lawfully possesses a controlled substance for his own use, for the use of a member of his household, or for administration to an animal owned by him or a member of his
household.
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, § 2; 1977, ch. 29,
§ 3; 1979, ch. 12, § 1; 1981, ch. 75, § 1; 1982,
ch. 12, § 1; 1987, ch. 190, § 1; 1989, ch. 50,
§ 1; 1989, ch. 186, § 1; 1989, ch. 225, § 60.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment alphabetized the definitions and renumbered the subsections accordingly; in Subsection (5), designated the existing language as
Subsection (a), added Subsection (b), and, in
Subsection (a), deleted "controlled" preceding
the first two instances of "substance" and substituted "falsely purports to be a controlled
substance" for "thereby falsely purports or is
represented to be the product of, or to have
been"; deleted a definition of "Distribute for
value" contained in former Subsection (8); deleted "far" preceding "dependent" in Subsection (14); deleted the former undesignated
paragraph at the end of this section, which
read "This act does not infringe upon the rights
of citizens to purchase and use herbs and food
supplements of vegetable origin and does not
restrict the non-allopathic practitioners, the
herbalist, the massage therapists"; and made
minor changes in phraseology throughout the
section.

The 1989 amendment by Chapter 225, effective March 14, 1989, substituted "Department
of Commerce" for "Department of Business
Regulation" in Subsection (7) and "Health and
Human Services" for "Health, Education and
Welfare" in Subsections (8)(b)(iii) and (8)(d).
The 19&9 amendment by Chapter 186, effective April 1, 1989, inserted "or a listed chemical" in Subsections (6) and (11) and corrected a
typographical error in Subsection (8).
The 1989 amendment by Chapter 50, effective April 24, 1989, substituted "species of the
genus Cannabis and all parts of the genus" for
"parts of the plant cannabis sativa L." near the
beginning of the first sentence and inserted "or
any other species of the genus Cannabis" in the
last sentence of Subsection (19) and made a
stylistic change in Subsection (33).
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
Federal law. — The federal Controlled Substances Act, cited in Subsection (4), is codified
as 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. Section 201 of the
Act is 21 U.S.C. § 811.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Distribution.
The evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for distribution of a controlled substance where the defendant, who was approached with a request to sell marijuana to a
police officer, agreed, quoted the selling price,

and then personally delivered the contraband
and received the money at his apartment; he
did not merely find, direct, and introduce the
offker to another drug dealer. State v. F\xe\,
744 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1987).
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M e a n i n g of " t h i s act". — See the note under the same c a u h l m e following $ 58-37-1.

(27) to (30); and designated former Subsection
(27) as the last paragraph.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Delivery.
Distribution.
Incomplete sale.
"Production."
Delivery.
The definition for delivery makes it clearr
that agency is not to be considered in findingg
criminal culpability under the Controlled Sub-»stances Act. State v. Casias, 567 P.2d 10977
(Utah 1977).
Distribution.
There was no distribution by the defendant^
where an undercover police.agent gave mari-"
juana to the defendant. State v. Soroushirn,l '
571 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1977).
Incomplete sale.
Where defendant agreed to sell cocaine to ana
undercover agent, and the parties then pro->ceeded, with the cocaine, to another location inn
order that the agent could obtain money for thee
purchase, a distribution of cocaine for value didd

not take place, although the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for the lesser
ofYense of attempt to distribute a controlled
substance. State v. Devlin, 699 P.2d 717 (Utah
1985).
"Production."
The cooking and adding of chemicals to the
marijuana plant in an effort to produce "hash,"
a more potent and concentrated form of marijuana, was sufficient to indicate defendants intended to engage in the processing of a controlled substance directly or indirectly by extraction from substances of natural origin and
to sustain a conviction for possession with intent to produce or manufacture a controlled
substance. State v. Horsley, 596 P.2d 661
(Utah 1979>.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 25 Am. Jur. 2d Drugs, Narcotics, and Poisons § 7 et seq.
C.J.S. — 72 C.J.S. Poisons § 1.

Key N u m b e r s . — Drugs and Narcotics <£=»
42; Poisons <£= 2.

58-37-3. Substances which are controlled — Revised federal schedules govern.
(1) All controlled substances listed in § 58-37-4 are hereby controlled.
(2) All controlled substances listed in the Federal Controlled Substances
Act (Title II, P.L. 91-513), as it is amended from time to time, are hereby
controlled.
(3) Whenever any substance is designated, rescheduled or deleted as a controlled substance in schedules I, II, III, IV or V of the Federal Controlled
Substances Act (Title II, P.L. 91-513), as such schedules may be revised by
Congressional enactment or by administrative rule of the United States Attorney General adopted pursuant to § 201 of that act, that subsequent designation, rescheduling or deletion shall govern.
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, § 3; 1979, ch. 12,
§ 2.
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bis plant; consequently, in prosecution for possession of marijuana, prosecution need not prove
that substance found in defendant's possession
consisted of proscribed portions of Cannabis
plant. United States v Span (1975. CA10 Kan)
515 F2d 579.
To extent hashish contains THC it is controlled substance under 21 USCS §802(15).
United States v Kelly (1976, CA9 Idaho) 527
F2d 961.
District Court did not err in instructing jurythat 21 USCS § 802(15), which defines marijuana
as plant cannabis sativa L. comprehends other
forms of plant and prohibits possession of all
varieties of marijuana. United States v Gagnon
(1980. CA10 Okla) 635 F2d 766, cert den 451
US 1018, 69 L Ed 2d 390. 101 S Ct 3008.
21 USCS §802(15) outlaws all species of
marijuana
containing
tetrahydrocannabinol.
United States v Lupo (CA7 Wis) 652 F2d 723,
cert den 457 US 1135, 73 L Ed 2d 1353, 102 S
Ct 2964).
Congress intended inclusion of indicia variety
within definition of marijuana. United States v
Moore (1970, ED Pa) 330 F Supp 684, affd
(CA3 Pa) 446 F2d 448, cert den 406 US 909. 31
L Ed 2d 820, 92 S Ct 1617.

DRUGS

purposes. United States v Stieren (1979, CA8
Iowa) 608 F2d 1135.
Combined effect of statutory definitions of
"dispense" and "practitioner" is to limit meaning of "dispense" to delivery of controlled substances by physician acting in course of professional practice or research; delivery of controlled
substances outside course of professional practice
or research constitutes "distributing", which violates 21 USCS § 841(a)(1), even if carried on by
registered physician. United States v Badia
(1973. CA1 Mass) 490 F2d 296 (disagreed with
United States v Genser (CA10 Colo) 710 F2d
1426).
Although statutory definition of "narcotic
drug" is broader than dictionary definition. Congress need not follow latter in applying term to
number of different classes of drugs for purposes
of legal control: classification of cocaine within
definition of "narcotic drug" under 21 USCS
§802(16) is not arbitrary and irrational. United
States v Di Laura (1974, DC Mass) 394 F Supp
770.
9. "Practitioner"
"Osteopathic physicians" in Kansas were not
"physicians." Burke v Kansas State Osteopathic
Asso, Inc. (1940, CA10 Kan) 111 F2d 250.
Doctor who acts other than in course of
professional practice is not practitioner under
Controlled Substance Act and is therefore not
authorized to prescribe controlled substances and
is subject to criminal provisions of act. United
States v Rosenberg (1975, CA9 Cal) 515 F2d
190, 33 ALR Fed 196, cert den 423 US 1031, 46
L Ed 2d 404, 96 S Ct 562 and (disagreed with
United States v Genser (CalO Colo) 710 F2d
1426).
Osteopath was "physician." Hostetler v Woodworth (1928, DC Mich) 28 F2d 1003.

8. "Narcotic drug"
Definition of "narcotic drugs*' as used in
predecessor to this section included cocaine.
Lastra Padilla v United States (1960. CA5 Fla)
278 F2d 188.
Legislative history of 21 USCS § 802(15) indicates definition of marijuana was intended to
only include those parts of marijuana which
contain tetrahydrocannabinol. Thomas v United
States (1976, Dist Col App) 352 A2d 390.
Definition of marijuana as Cannabis sativa
within meaning of 21 USCS §802(15) includes
all Cannabis, even though Cannabis sativa is
only one of several species of marijuana. People
v Riddle (1975) 65 Mich App 433, 237 NW2d
491.
Percodan tablets containing one per cent of
"dihydrohydroxycodeinone hydrochloride" commonly called codeinone, were narcotics within
meaning of predecessor to this section. Rivas v
United States (1966, CA9 Cal) 368 F2d 703, cert
den 386 US 945, 17 L Ed 2d 875, 87 S Ct 980
and (disagreed with United States v Himmelwright (CA5 Fla) 551 F2d 991, cert den 434 US
902, 54 L Ed 2d 189, 98 S Ct 298).
Congress has perogative to classify cocaine,
which is non-narcotic central nervous system
stimulent, as narcotic for penalty and regulatory

10. "Ultimate user"
Term "ultimate user" includes person who has
obtained drug for his own use; it does not
require that he in fact use it therefor. United
States v Bartee (1973, CA10 Colo) 479 F2d 484.
11. "United States"
Suitcase containing cocaine which had been
abandoned on luggage carousel at Miami Airport
had been imported into "United States" within
meaning of 21 USCS §802(26). United States v
Catano (1977, CA5 Fla) 553 F2d 497, 2 Fed
Rules Evid Serv 73, cert den 434 US 865, 54 L
Ed 2d 140, 98 S Ct 199.
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[Repealed]
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES

This section (Act Oct. 27, 1970, P. L. 91-513, Title II, Part A, § 103,
84 Stat. 1245) was repealed by Act Oct. 18, 1977, P. L. 95-137. § 1(b),
91 Stat. 1169. This section authorized the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs to add 300 agents and necessary supporting personnel.
AUTHORITY TO CONTROL; STANDARDS AND SCHEDULES

§ 811.

Authority and criteria for classification of substances

(a) Rules and regulations of Attorney General; hearing. The Attorney
General shall apply the provisions of this title to the controlled substances
listed in the schedules established by section 202 of this title [21 USCS
§812] and to any other drug or other substance added to such schedules
under this title. Except as provided in subsections (d) and (e), the Attorney
General may by rule—
(1) add to such a schedule or transfer between such schedules any drug
or other substance if he—
(A) finds that such drug or other substance has a potential for abuse,
and
(B) makes with respect to such drug or other substance the findings
prescribed by subsection (b) of section 202 [21 USCS § 812(b)] for the
schedule in which such drug is to be placed; or
(2) remove any drug or other substance from the schedules if he finds
that the drug or other substance does not meet the requirements for
inclusion in any schedule.
Rules of the Attorney General under this subsection shall be made on the
record after opportunity for a hearing pursuant to the rulemaking procedures prescribed by subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5 of the United
States Code [5 USCS §§551 et seq.]. Proceedings for the issuance,
amendment, or repeal of such rules may be initiated by the Attorney
General (1) on his own motion, (2) at the request of the Secretary, or (3)
on the petition of any interested party.
(b) Evaluation of drugs and other substances. The Attorney General shall,
before initiating proceedings under subsection (a) to control a drug or
other substance or to remove a drug or other substance entirely from the
schedules, and after gathering the necessary data, request from the Secretary a scientific and medical evaluation, and his recommendations, as to
whether such drug or other substance should be so controlled or removed
as a controlled substance. In making such evaluation and recommendations, the Secretary shall consider the factors listed in paragraphs (2), (3),
(6), (7), and (8) of subsection (c) and any scientific or medical considera107
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tions involved in paragraphs (1), (4), and (5) of such subsection. The
recommendations of the Secretary shall include recommendations with
respect to the appropriate schedule, if any, under which such drug or other
substance should be listed. The evaluation and the recommendations of the
Secretary shall be made in writing and submitted to the Attorney General
within a reasonable time. The recommendations of the Secretary to the
Attorney General shall be binding on the Attorney General as to such
scientific and medical matters, and if the Secretary recommends that a
drug or other substance not be controlled, the Attorney General shall not
control the drug or other substance. If the Attorney General determines
that these facts and all other relevant data constitute substantial evidence
of potential for abuse such as to warrant control or substantial evidence
that the drug or other substance should be removed entirely from the
schedules, he shall initiate proceedings for control or removal, as the case
may be, under subsection (a).
(c) Factors determinative of control or removal from schedules. In making
any finding under subsection (a) of this section or under subsection (b) of
section 202 [21 USCS § 812(b)], the Attorney General shall consider the
following factors with respect to each drug or other substance proposed to
be controlled or removed from the schedules:
(1) Its actual or relative potential for abuse.
(2) Scientific evidence of its pharmacological effect, if known.
(3) The state of current scientific knowledge regarding the drug or other
substance.
(4) Its history and current pattern of abuse.
(5) The scope, duration, and significance of abuse.
(6) What, if any, risk there is to the public health.
(7) Its psychic or physiological dependence liability.
(8) Whether the substance is an immediate precursor of a substance
already controlled under this title.
(d) International treaties, conventions, and protocols requiring control;
procedures respecting changes in drug schedules of Convention on
Psychotropic Substances. (1) If control is required by United States
obligations under international treaties, conventions, or protocols in
effect on the effective date of this part, the Attorney General shall issue
an order controlling such drug under the schedule he deems most
appropriate to carry out such obligations, without regard to the findings
required by subsection (a) of this section or section 202(b) [21 USCS
§ 812(b)] and without regard to the procedures prescribed by subsections
(a) and (b) of this section.
(2)(A) Whenever the Secretary of State receives notification from the
Secretary-General of the United Nations that information has been
transmitted by or to the World Health Organization, pursuant to
article 2 of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, which may
108
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justify adding a drug or other substance to one of the schedules of the
Convention, transferring a drug or substance from one schedule to
another, or deleting it from the schedules, the Secretary of State shall
immediately transmit the notice to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare [Secretary of Health and Human Services] who
shall publish it in the Federal Register and provide opportunity to
interested persons to submit to him comments respecting the scientific
and medical evaluations which he is to prepare respecting such drug
or substance. The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
[Secretary of Health and Human Services] shall prepare for transmission through the Secretary of State to the World Health Organization
such medical and scientific evaluations as may be appropriate regarding the possible action that could be proposed by the World Health
Organization respecting the drug or substance with respect to which a
notice was transmitted under this subparagraph.
(B) Whenever the Secretary of State receives information that the
Commission on Narcotic Drugs of the United Nations proposes to
decide whether to add a drug or other substance to one of the
schedules of the Convention, transfer a drug or substance from one
schedule to another, or delete it from the schedules, the Secretary of
State shall transmit timely notice to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare [Secretary of Health and Human Services] of such
information who shall publish a summary of such information in the
Federal Register and provide opportunity to interested persons to
submit to him comments respecting the recommendation which he is
to furnish, pursuant to this subparagraph, respecting such proposal.
The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare [Secretary of Health
and Human Services] shall evaluate the proposal and furnish a
recommendation to the Secretary of State which shall be binding on
the representative of the United States in discussions and negotiations
relating to the proposal.
(3) When the United States receives notification of a scheduling decision
pursuant to article 2 of the Convention of Psychotropic Substances that
a drug or other substance has been added or transferred to a schedule
specified in the notification or receives notification (referred to in this
subsection as a "schedule notice") that existing legal controls applicable
under this title to a drug or substance and the controls required by the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act [21 USCS §§ 301 et seq.] do not
meet the requirements of the schedule of the Convention in which such
drug or substance has been placed, the Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare [Secretary of Health and Human Services], after consultation with the Attorney General, shall first determine whether existing
legal controls under this title applicable to the drug or substance and the
controls required by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act [21
USCS §§ 301 et seq.], meet the requirements of the schedule specified in
the notification or schedule notice and shall take the following action:
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(A) If such requirements are met by such existing controls but the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare [Secretary of Health and
Human Services] nonetheless believes that more stringent controls
should be applied to the drug or substance, the Secretary shall
recommend to the Attorney General that he initiate proceedings for
scheduling the drug or substance, pursuant to subsections (a) and (b)
of this section, to apply to such controls.
(B) If such requirements are not met by such existing controls and
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare [Secretary of Health
and Human Services] concurs in the scheduling decision or schedule
notice transmitted by the notification, the Secretary shall recommend
to the Attorney General that he initiate proceedings for scheduling
the drug or substance under the appropriate schedule pursuant to
subsections (a) and (b) of this section.
(C) If such requirements are not met by such existing controls and
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare [Secretary of Health
and Human Services] does not concur in the scheduling decision or
schedule notice transmitted by the notification, the Secretary shall—
(i) if he deems that additional controls are necessary to protect the
public health and safety, recommend to the Attorney General that
he initiate proceedings for scheduling the drug or substance pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) of this section, to apply such
additional controls;
(ii) request the Secretary of State to transmit a notice of qualified
acceptance, within the period specified in the Convention, pursuant
to paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention, to the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations;
(iii) request the Secretary of State to transmit a notice of qualified
acceptance as prescribed in clause (ii) and request the Secretary of
State to ask for a review by the Economic and Social Council of
the United Nations, in accordance with paragraph 8 of article 2 of
the Convention, of the scheduling decision; or
(iv) in the case of a schedule notice, request the Secretary of State
to take appropriate action under the Convention to initiate proceedings to remove the drug or substance from the schedules under
the Convention or to transfer the drug or substance to a schedule
under the Convention different from the one specified in the
schedule notice.
(4)(A) If the Attorney General determines, after consultation with the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare [Secretary of Health and
Human Services], that proceedings initiated under recommendations
made under paragraph [subparagraph] (B) or (C)(i) of paragraph (3)
will not be completed within the time period required by paragraph 7
of article 2 of the Convention, the Attorney General, after consultation with the Secretary and after providing interested persons opportunity to submit comments respecting the requirements of the tempo110
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rary order to be issued under this sentence, shall issue a temporary
order controlling the drug or substance under schedule IV or V,
whichever is most appropriate to carry out the minimum United
States obligations under paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention.
As a part of such order, the Attorney General shall, after consultation
with the Secretary, except such drug or substance from the application of any provision of part C of this title [21 USCS §§ 821 et seq.]
which he finds is not required to carry out the United States
obligations under paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention. In the
case of proceedings initiated under subparagraph (B) of paragraph (3),
the Attorney General, concurrently with the issuance of such order,
shall request the Secretary of State to transmit a notice of qualified
acceptance to the Secretary-General of the United Nations pursuant
to paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention. A temporary order
issued under this subparagraph controlling a drug or other substance
subject to proceedings initiated under subsections (a) and (b) of this
section shall expire upon the effective date of the application to the
drug or substance of the controls resulting from such proceedings.
(B) After a notice of qualified acceptance of a scheduling decision
with respect to a drug or other substance is transmitted to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations in accordance with clause (ii)
or (iii) of paragraph (3)(C) or after a request has been made under
clause (iv) of such paragraph with respect to a drug or substance
described in a schedule notice, the Attorney General, after consultation with the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare [Secretary
of Health and Human Services] and after providing interested persons
opportunity to submit comments respecting the requirements of the
order to be issued under this sentence, shall issue an order controlling
the drug or substance under schedule IV or V, whichever is most
appropriate to carry out the minimum United States obligations under
paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention in the case of a drug or
substance for which a notice of qualified acceptance was transmitted
or whichever the Attorney General determines is appropriate in the
case of a drug or substance described in a schedule notice. As a part
of such order, the Attorney General shall, after consultation with the
Secretary, except such drug or substance from the application of any
provision of part C of this title [21 USCS §§821 et seq.] which he
finds is not required to carry out the United States obligations under
paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention. If, as a result of a review
under paragraph 8 of article 2 of the Convention of the scheduling
decision with respect to which a notice of qualified acceptance was
transmitted in accordance with clause (ii) or (iii) of paragraph
(3)(Q(i) the decision is reversed, and
(ii) the drug or substance subject to such decision is not required to
be controlled under schedule IV or V to carry out the minimum
111
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United States obligations under paragraph 7 of article 2 of the
Convention,
the order issued under this subparagraph with respect to such drug or
substance shall expire upon receipt by the United States of the review
decision If, as a result of action taken pursuant to action initiated
under a request transmitted under clause (iv) of paragraph (3)(C), the
drug or substance with respect to which such action was taken is not
required to be controlled under schedule IV or V, the order issued
under this paragraph with respect to such drug or substance shall
expire upon receipt by the United States of a notice of the action
taken with respect to such drug or substance under the Convention
(C) An order issued under subparagraph (A) or (B) mav be issued
without regard to the findings required by subsection (a) of this
section or by section 202(b) [21 USCS § 812(b)] and without regard to
the procedures prescribed by subsection (a) or (b) of this section
(5) Nothing in the amendments made by the Psychotropic Substances
Act of 1978, or the regulations or orders promulgated thereunder shall
be construed to preclude requests by the Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare [Secretary of Health and Human Services] or the Attorney
General through the Secretary of State, pursuant to article 2 or other
applicable provisions of the Convention, for review of scheduling decisions under such Convention, based on new or additional information
(e) Immediate precursors. The Attorney General mav, without regard to
the findings required by subsection (a) of this section or section 202(b) [21
USCS § 812(b)] and without regard to the procedures prescribed by
subsections (a) and (b) of this section, place an immediate precursor in the
same schedule in which the controlled substance of which it is .an
immediate precursor is placed or in any other schedule with a higher
numerical designation If the Attorney General designates a substance as
an immediate precursor and places it in a schedule, other substances shall
not be placed in a schedule solely because they are its precursors
(0 Abuse potential. If, at the time a new-drug application is submitted to
the Secretary for any drug having a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system, it appears that such drug has an
abuse potential, such information shall be forwarded by the Secretary to
the Attorney General
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date of such enactment [enacted Oct 27, 1970] pursuant to the foregoing provisions of this section
(Oct 27, 1970, P L 91-513, Title II, Part B, §201, 84 Stat 1245, Nov
10, 1978, P L 95-633, Title I, § 102(a), 92 Stat 3769)
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
References in text:
"This title ', referred to in this section, is Title II of Act Oct 27, 1970,
P L 91 513, 84 Stat 1242, which appears generally as 21 USCS
§§ 801 et seq For full classification of such Title, consult USCS Tables
volumes
"The effective date of this part", referred to in this section, is Oct 27,
1970 which is the effective date of Part B of Title II of Act Oct 27,
1970. P L 91-M3, as provided by § 704(b) of such Act, which appears
as 21 USCS ^ 801 note "Schedule IV or V", referred to in this section,
appears in 21 USCS § 812(c)
"The Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978" referred to in this section,
is Act Nov 10, 1978, P L 95 633 <>2 Stat 3768 which amended this
section, among other things for full classification of this Act, consult
USCS Tables volumes
Explanatory notes:
The bracketed words "Secretary of Health and Human Services" are
inserted on authontv of Act Oct 17, 1979 P L 96-88, Title V, § 509,
93 Stat 695 which appears as 20 USCS § 3508, and which redesignated the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare as the Secretary
of Health and Human Services and provided that any reference to the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, in any law in force on the
effective date of such Act Oct 17, 1979, shall be deemed to refer and
applv to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, except to the
extent such reference is to a function or office transferred to the
Secretary of Education or the Department of Education under such
Act Oct 17 1979
The bracketed word "subparagraph" is inserted in subsec (d)(4)(A) of
this section as the word probably intended by Congress
Effective date of section:
Act Oct 27, 1970, P L 91-513, Title II, Part G. § 704(b), 84 Stat
1284, which appears as 21 USCS § 801 note, provided that this section
is effective upon enactment on Oct 27 1970
Amendments:
1978. Act Nov 10, 1978, in subsec (d), designated the existing
provisions as para (1), and added paras (2)-(5)

(g) Non-narcotic substances sold over the counter without a prescription;
dextromethorphan. (1) The Attorney General shall by regulation exclude
any nonnarcotic substance from a schedule if such substance may, under
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act [21 USCS §§ 301 et seq ], be
lawfully sold over the counter without a prescription
(2) Dextromethorphan shall not be deemed to be included in any
schedule by reason of enactment of this title unless controlled after the

Other provisions:
Effective date of 1978 amendment. Act Nov 10, 1978, P L 95-633,
Title I, § 112, 92 Stat 3774, which appears as 21 USCS § 801a note,
provided that the amendment of this section shall take effect on the
date the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, signed at Vienna,
Austria on February 21, 1971, enters into force in respect to the United
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"Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, this subtitle [adding 21 USCS §971 and
note and notes to § 801. and amending this section and 21 USCS §§ 830. 841, 842, 872,
876, 881, 960, 961] shall take effect 120 days after the enactment of this Act.".
RESEARCH GUIDE
Federal Procedure L Ed:
Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics. Fed Proc, L Ed §§ 35:665, 35:669.
Forms:
15 Federal Procedural Forms L Ed, Statutes of Limitation, and Other Time Limits § 61:32.
INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS
7. "Marijuana"
Weight of marijuana plant stalks will not be
For purposes of 21 USCS § 801, et seq., manconsidered for purposes of sentence enhancement
juana is "controlled substance." United States v
under 21 USCS § 841(b)(1)(A) (vii), where mariOne 1977 36 Foot Cigarette Ocean Racer (1985, juana was seized at stage before it was turned into
SD Fla) 624 F Supp 290.
readily marketable and consumable product and
Conviction for possession with intent to distribwhere 21 USCS § 802(16) excludes stalks from
ute "quantity of hashish, substance containing
definition of marijuana, because under "market
tetrahydrocannabinol" will not be overturned, deapproach" adopted by Congress in legislative hisspite defendants' argument that evidence was inenhanced penalties should only applv when
tory
sufficient to prove that what they possessed was a l l marijuana seized is marketable, and such intercontrolled substance, and that variance between
p r e t a t i o n a V o i d s inequity of penalizing individual
description of charge or drug possessed in indict
w U h u n m a r k e t a b l e marijuana same as individual
ment and jury instructions and proof of charge or
^
same
amount
of
marketable
m a r i j U ana.
drug assessed presented at tnal requires acquittal,
^ p
Mi„er (,9 g
£ D T
because (1) even though actual seized substance o r
c
iiR9
upp
chemical analysis thereof was never adduced at
trial, testimony by evidence technician who issued
8. "Narcotic drug"
substance to undercover agents who sold it to
I n determining whether certain substance was
defendants by police officer present with drug dog
i a t e d e r i v a t i v e drug enforcement agency adminat scene of arrest and by forensic chemist who
istrator undef 2, u s c s § 802
CQnsider the
gave definitions of hashish and sea-hash was s u b s t a n c e . s p h a r r a a c o l o g i c a , e f f c c t s a s a s p e c t o f
sufficient to show beyond reasonable doubt that
. _ ..
/ „ . . . ,,
. j • •4 » >
substance seized from defendants was illegal "de- d e f i n , t , o n ° f d T j T e ; . and administrator s r e rivative of marijuana" under 21 USCS §§812, jection o f 2-step definition of derivative ,n which
u ,s s a i d t h a
802(16), and (2) defects in indictment and jury
[ substance is derivative of another
onl
instructions which mistakenly characterized hashy , f , l c a n be produced from it in only one or 2
ish seized as "substance containing T H C " instead
chemical operations, is sufficiently reasonable and
of "derivative of marijuana" neither confused jury
consistent with the act's purposes to warrant judinor affected any substantial right of defendants so
cial deference, particularly considering the adminas to require upset of conviction under 21 USCS
istrator's expertise in area. Reckitt & Colman, Ltd.
§ 841(a)(1) United States v McMahon (1987, DC
v Administrator, Drug Enforcement Admin.
Me) 673 F Supp 8.
(1986, App DC) 788 F2d 22.

DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION

21 USCS

USCS § 812] if the substance is not listed in any other schedule in section 202 [21
§ 812] or if no exemption or approval is in effect for t h e substance under section
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act [21 USCS § 355]. Such an order may
issued before the expiration of thirty days from—
(A) the date of the publication by the A t t o r n e y General of a notice in the I
Register of the intention to issue such order and t h e g r o u n d s upon which such o
to be issued, and
(B) the date the Attorney General has transmitted the notice required by par;
(4).
(2) The scheduling of a substance under this subsection shall expire at the end of or
from the date of the issuance of the order scheduling such substance, except th
Attorney General may, during the pendency of proceedings under subsection (a)(l
respect to the substance, extend the t e m p o r a r y scheduling for u p to six months.
(3) When issuing an order under paragraph (1), the A t t o r n e y General shall be requi
consider, with respect to the finding of an imminent h a z a r d to the public safety
those factors set forth in paragraphs (4), (5), and (6) of subsection (c), including
abuse, diversion from legitimate channels, and clandestine importation, manufactu
distribution.
(4) The Attorney General shall transmit notice of an o r d e r proposed to be issued
paragraph (1) to the Secretary of Health and H u m a n Services. In issuing an order
paragraph (1), the Attorney General shall take into consideration any comments si
ted by the Secretary in response to a notice transmitted p u r s u a n t to this paragraph.
(5) An order issued under paragraph (1) with respect to a substance shall be vacated
the conclusion of a subsequent rulemaking proceeding initiated under subsection (a]
respect to such substance.
(6) An order issued under paragraph (1) is not subject to judicial review.
(As amended Oct. 12, 1984, P. L. 98-473, Title II, Ch V, P a r t B, § 509(a), 98 Stat. 2072
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
Amendments:
1984. Act Oct. 12, 1984, in subsec. (g) added para. (3); and added subsec. (h).
RESEARCH GUIDE
Federal Procedure L Ed:
Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics, Fed Proc. L Ed §§ 35:513, 35:540-545, 35:547-548, 35:629.
Am Jur:
2 Am Jur 2d, Administrative Law § 395.

INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS
6. Judicial review
quired to respond to petition for such a rul<
to
1 Constitutionality
' n ^ o r r n petitioner that petition will nc
' 21 USCS § 811(h) is permissible delegation of
^ , c e P t e d J f * " * ™lc f a l , s o u A t s j d e s c ? J * f j
§ 8 1 1 . Authority and criteria for classification of substances
E nf rCement Adm,n
congressional power and iTnot so arbitrary that it
2 s e n v j?!"*
°
- °985' i
7
2
(a)-(f) [Unchanged]
does not comport with due process, since tempo'
Previous delegation of permanent schedulir
(g) Non-narcotic substances sold over t h e counter without a prescription; d e x t r o m e t h o r p h a n . ! rary scheduling criteria are as specific as reasonably practicable to meet imminent threat to public
Attorney General to Administrator of DEA
(1), (2) [Unchanged]
I safety while providing sufficient guidance, absence
not delegate power to schedule drugs tempoi
under 21 USCS § 811(h), since procedure and
(3) T h e Attorney G e n e r a l may, by regulation, exempt any compound, mixture, o r l of notice and public comment is permissible where
of Administrator in temporary scheduling i
preparation containing a controlled substance from the application of all or any part o n temporary scheduling is emergency measure lasting at most 18 months, lengthy public comment
most entirely different than permanent sched
this title if he finds such c o m p o u n d , mixture, or preparation meets the requirements o l would jeopardize public safety, and public hearings
under § 811(a), and failure of Congress or A
one of the following categories:
I are held for consideration of permanent schedulney General to challenge or correct Admini
tor's actions, or tacit approval of those actior
(A) A mixture, or preparation containing a nonnarcotic controlled substance, which! ing, constitutionally imposed requirement of judinot substitute for express delegation of authc
mixture or preparation is approved for prescription use, and which contains one orl cial review would invalidate many statutes which
United States v Emerson (1988, CA9 Cal) 846
more other active ingredients which are not listed in any schedule and which are! preclude judicial review, harsh punishment of
those distributing temporarily scheduled sub541.
included therein in s u c h combinations, quantity, proportion, or concentration as to! stances is not irrational means of reducing hazard,
Guidelines under 21 USCS §811(h) are s
vitiate the potential for abuse.
I and determination of imminent threat to safety
d e n t | y p r e c j s e f o r d e | e g ation of legislative p<
(B) A c o m p o u n d , mixture, or preparation which contains any controlled substance! without scientific evaluation is reasonable basis for
t o A t t o r n e y G e n e r a , t o temporarily add substa
which is not for administration to a h u m a n being or animal, and which is packaged in temporarily scheduling substances. United States v t 0 S c h e d u l e i o f Controlled Substances Act
u s c s § § g Q | e t s e q } j f n e c e s s a r y t Q a v o j d if]
such form or concentration, or with adulterants or denaturants, so that as packaged if Emerson (1988, CA9 Cal) 846 F2d 541.
nent hazard to public safety; thus, tempo
does not present any significant potential for abuse.
I 2. Administrative procedures
placement of 3.4 methylenedioxymethamphetar
(h) Temporary scheduling of substance in schedule I to avoid imminent public safety hazard} Administrative rule authorizing religious exemption
for
use
of
marijuana
may
not
be
made
under
(MDMA) on Schedule I by Drug Enforcer
( I ) If t h e Attorney G e n e r a l finds that the scheduling of a substance in schedule I [21
authority of 21 USCS § 811; however, administraAdministration is permissible. United State
USCS § 812] on a t e m p o r a r y basis is necessary to avoid an imminent h a z a r d to the publiJ tor of Drug Enforcement Administration is reLichtman (1986, SD Fla) 636 F Supp 438.
safety, h e may, by order and without regard to the requirements of subsection (b) relatinl
to the Secretary of H e a l t h and H u m a n Services, schedule such substance in schedule I [ 2 |
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eleven utilities which responded to the
Notice argued that revocation of | 2.14
would be tn the public interest.
Niagara-Mohawk Power Company
stated that the same information is
reported to the New York Energy Office,
to the New York Public Service
Commission as part of rate cases, and to
the Electric Power Research Institute
where it is catalogued and made
available to the public. Georgia Power
Company stated that the i 2.14 reports
are redundant because of other reports
required by other agencies.
Consolidated Edison Company of New
York noted its belief that reports filed
under this section were not susceptible
to use as a basis for Commission
findings.
Effective Date
This rule is to be elective January 1,
1U80.
(Federal Power Art. as amended. 16 U S.C.
7U2~828i:, Department of Energy Organization
Art. 40 U.S.C 7101 7352. E.O 12009, 42 FR
4tt2tt7)
In consideration of the foregoing, Part
2, Subchapter A of Chapter i. Title 18,
Code of Federal Regulations is hereby
amended as set forth below, effective
January 1, 1980.
By the Commission.
Kaniutth F Plumb,
Svt rvtory.
§ 2.14 [ftovofcrtl
Section 2.14 is revoked.
|FF HocTO.JMJfM FVmi 12- II -7ft 145 «m(
•4UJMO COOt 446^41-M

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
21 CFR Part 1308
Schedules of Controlled Substances;
Schedule II Placement of
Phenylacetone; (Pnenyt-2-propanone,
P2P, benzyl methyl ketone, methyl
benzyl ketone)
AGfMCY: Drug Enforcement
Administration. Justice.
ACTION; Final Order
SUMMARY: This is n r'inul Order issued
by the Administrator of the Drug
Enforcement Administration placing the
substance, phenylacetone, also known
as phenyl 2 propanone, benzyl methyl
ketone, methyl benzyl ketone and P2P,
into Schedule II of the Controlled
Substances Act. This action results from
.the increasing evidence of use of
phenylacetone as. a major immediate
chemical prBcurnor to methamphetamine

and amphetamine in their illicit
clandestine synthesis. The effect of the
present Order provides regulatory
controls upon the manufacture,
distribution, dispensing, Importation and
exportation of this immediate precursor
to methamphetamine and amphetamine.
IFFtCTIVt DATS Of SCHiOUU II
CONTftOt: February It, 1980, except as
otherwise provided in
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
Section of thl3 Order.
FOR FUHTWf * INFORMATION CONTACT:
Howard McClain, Jr., Chief, Regulatory
Control Division, Drug Enforcement
Administration, Telephone: 202-6331366.
SUPPtlMENTARY INFORMATION: In
enacting the Controlled Substances Act
in 1970, Congress provided in Section
201(e) of the Act a mechanism for
allowing the Attorney General to place a
drug or chemical u»to a schedule of
control without the requirement of first
obtaining a medical and scientific
evaluation and recommendation from
the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare, without having to make
findings of his own on abuse and public
health risk, or concerning the schedule
considered, and without the need to
provide an opportunity for a rulemaking
hearing on the record in accordance
with the Administrative Procedures Act
(5 U.S.C. 551-559). In lieu of these
procedures otherwise required for the
traditional scheduling of drugs or other
substances, Congress allowed the
Attorney General to schedule a drug or
substance if it was found by him to be
an immediate piecurftor as defined in
Section 102(22) of the Act. That section
provides as follows:
The term "immediate precursor"
means a substance—(A) Which the
Attorney General has found to be and
by regulation designated as being the
principal compound used, or produced
primarily for use, in the manufacture of
a controlled substance; (B) Which is an
immediate chemical intermediary useo
or likHv to be used in the manufacture
of such
trolled substance: and (C)
The con.,»-">i of which is necessary to
prevent, curtail, or limit the manufacture
of such controlled substance.
In establishing this alternative
scheduling procedure, Congress
intended to dispense with the formal,
and sometimes lengthy, administrative
regulatory rulemaking process in cases
where the risk was that clandestine
laboratories were making controlled
substances with <hemicals which
themselves were not controlled, but
which were one sti»p removed from
tur jir rut or becoming the controlled
Hal)liuuu»;* illicitly manufactured.

Congress recognized the need for this
summary scheduling mechanism as it
considered testimony provided to the
House Select Committee on Crime, 91st
Congress, 2nd Session, 1970-1971, (H.
Rept. No. 91-1807, p. 25-6), whieh stated
that entrepreneurs willing to set up
clandestine laboratories to manufacture
amphetamine and methamphetamine
would find easy manufacture and
realize high profits.
DEA's own investigations have
documented 268 illicit
methamphetamine and 45 illicit
amphetamine laboratories, seized from
1975 to November 1979. More important,
the illlicit methamphetamine
laboratories seized in the first eleven
months of this year is 106, compared
with 11 seized in all of 1975. These
statistics appear more alarming when
one considers that DEA's enforcement
effort obviously cannot account for 100%
of the illicit laboratories in operation.
Better control by DEA over this illicit
activity could be obtained if essential
ingredients used in the illicit
manufacture of methamphetamine and
amphetamine were regulated as are the
end-products—controlled substances.
DEA's investigations have shown that
at least three out of four
methamphetamine laboratories seized
since 1976 made, purchased or used
phenylacetone in one of two synthetic
methamphetamine manufacturing
processes. Of those, the more popular
process to make methamphetamine is
the reductive amination of
phenylacetone with methylamine in
ethanol with aluminum foil and mercuric
chloride catalysts. The second
mentioned process to make
methamphetamine is designated as the
Leuckart synthesis where phenylacetone
is heated with formic acid and
methylamine and hydrolyzed with
hydrochloric acid. Both processes can
produce amphetamine if methylamine is
simply replaced by ammonia (salts).
DEA laboratories have analyzed seized
samples of methamphetamine and
amphetamine of illicit manufacture and
have identified in those samples trace
amounts of phenylacetone.
These investigations and laboratory
analyses support the conclusion that
most of the illicit methamphetamine and
amphetamine produced by clandestine
laboratories resulted from their use of
phenylacetone as an essential ingredient
in the process.
Other trace substances haye been
found in the above-mentioned
methamphetamine and amphetamine
samples seized and analyzed The trace
Substances have been identified as byproducts of syntheHes and side-reactions
whi re phenyliiceit'fM* at its preiuisorv
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phenylacettc acid, was an essential
ingredient. This«further establishes an
additional concern that ilhcit
' ^oratories, manufacturing
u thamphetamine and amphetamine, in
some cases made, rather than
purchased, their own pheylacetone. This
capability drives the exposure ot illicit
laboratory activity deeper from law
enforcement's view by replacing the
marketplace transaction of purchasing
phenylacetone with the hidden activity
of making it.
Currently, the Drug Enforcement
Administration relies upon its Precursor
Liaison Program to identify excessive or
suspicious sa'ds, by manufacturers and
wholesalers to questionable purchasers,
of chemicals for their likely use in the
illicit manufacture of controlled
substances. Participating in this program
are at least one manufacturer and
numerous wholesalers of phenylacetone.
However, participation is voluntary, and
in the face of dramatically rising
numbers of seizures of illicit
methamphetamine and amphetamine
laboratories in recent years, the obvious
present need calls for requiring, not
requesting, sales and distribution
records and reports, security measures
and import restrictions, to control this
essential chemical used in the illicit
manufacture of methamphetamine and
amphetamine.
Such requirements would include
DRA registration of purchasers and
sellers of phenytacetone. and likely
would result in diminishing the
unhindered sales transactions now
occurring.
Therefore, in view of the foregoing,
the Administrator of the Drug
Enforcement Administration hereby
finds in accordance with Section 102(22)
of the Act (21 U S.C 802(22)). that
phenylacetone:
{t) Is the principal compound used, or
pioduced primarily for use. in the
manufacture of the Schedule 11
controlled substances
methamphetamine or amphetamine;
(2) Is an immediate chemical
intermediary used or likely to be used in
the manufacture of such substances, and
(3) The control of which is necessary
to prevent, curtail or limit the
manufacture of such controlled
substances.
Therefore, phenylacetone Is an
immediate precursor" of
methamphetamine 9m\ amphetamine as
defined in Section 102(22) of the Act (21
t' S.C. 802(22)) and thus may be placed
in Schedule II M* a re methamphetamine
and amphetamtrm.. wtthftut the necessity
of making the findings otherwise
required by Sections 201(a) and 202(b) of
the Act (21 U S C 811(a) and 812(b)) end

without regard ta the proceduree
otherwise required by Section 201(a)
and (b) of the A d (21 U S C 811(a) and
(b|) Such procedures which, under the
authority of Section 201(e) of the Act (21
U S C 811(e)). peed not be required in
controlling immediate precursors,
include the rulemaking proceduree ae
set forth in the AdmiH strati ve
Procedures Act (i U & C 531-460). and
the opportunity for a hearing on the
record
Therefore, the Administrator of the
Drug Enforcement Administration
hereby dispenses with issuing Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, and the
opportunity for a hearing on the record,
and issues this Final Order placing
phenylacetone into Schedule II of the
Act as an immediate precursor to
methamphetamine and amphetamine,
out of high regard for the need for
prompt controls over phenylacetone
without undue delay, which effective
amphetamine and methamphetamine
control demands, and in recognition of
the statutory authority to regulate
precursors expeditiously in any event.
Even so. the Administrator is
establishing the dates on which the first
Schedule II controls shall be imposed
upon the legitimate manufacture,
distribution, dispensing, importation,
and exportation of phenylacetone to be
no sooner than February 11. I960.
Within this two month period between
publication of this Order and the first
effective dates imposing regulatory
controls for phenylacetone, all
interested persona may submit
comments and objections related to the
issue whether, and to what extent the
required compliance by industry with
Schedule II controls will or might likely
hinder tbeir legitimate manufacturing
and sales activities with phenylacetone
so as to outweigh the expected benefit
to result from Schedule U placement of
phenylacetone in curbing illicit
manufacture of methamphetamine and
amphetamine The Administrator
affords this opportunity for comment
notwithstanding that he has earlier
asked for comments by interested
persons on this same <> <»e (40 FR 47525.
October 9,1975). In n
nse thereto,
twenty nine letters w«v
<»ved and
the general nature of th%»<u was that
phenylacetone Is used in the
pharma* < Heal industry to make
amphetamine and amphetamine like
products, and minimally In research.
Most respondents stated phenylacetone
wan rrnt usfff fa ?h<Mr tTtdtntrle'
processes, which included rubber
processing and the manufacture of
chemicals- Five opposed control citing

that additional recordkeeping and
security measures could be burdensome
The Administrator, however, intends
to learn how industry would currently
regard this present control action, and
for this reason, is offering the sixty day
comment period established by this
Order.
Should the Administrator receive
comments or objections on the
aforementioned issue which raise
significant questions on the ability of
industry to comply with Schedule II
controls for phenylacetone. he shall
immediately suspend the effectiveness
of this Order as it relates to this
imposition of Schedule II regulatory
controls until he may reconsider that
portion of this Order in light of such
comments and objections so filed.
Thereafter, he may reinstate, revoke or
amend this Order as he determines is
appropriate.
Comments should be submitted in
quintuplicate to the Administrator. Drug
Enforcement Administration. United
States Department of Justice. 1405 I
Street, NW. Washington. DC. 20637.
Attention: DEA Federal Register
Representative. Dated: December 7,
1979.
Therefore, pursuant to 21 U.S.C 811(e)
and regulations of the Drug Enforcement
Administration and of the Department
of Justice, the Administrator of the Drug
Enforcement Administration hereby
orders that phenylacetone be included
in Schedule II of the Act, and that
S 1906.12 of Title 21. Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) be amended by
creating a new subsection (f).
designated Immediate precursors, and
including therein phenylacetone as set
forth below. Additionally, the
Administrator takes the present
opportunity to make a non-substantive
change in the listing of other immediate
precursors, by removing 1
phenylcyclohexylamine, and 1piperidinocyclohexanecarbonitrile
(PCC), which are immediate precursors
to phencydidine (PCP). from where they
currently nppear in subsection (e)
(DepressMuhi) of } 1308.12 and re listing
them in the new subsection (f)« and by
re -nun; baring Secobarbital as item (5) in
i 1308.12(e).
130*12
*

*

Schedule*.
•

•

4

(f) fmmrdiatf* precursors Unless
specifically excepted or unless listed in
another schedule, any material,
compound, mixture, or preparation
which contains any quantity of the
following substances;
(1) Immediate precursor to
amphetamine and methamphetamine
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(i) Phenyiacetone—8801
Some trade or other names: phenyl-2propanonr. P2P*. benzyl methyl ketone:
methyl benzyl ketone;
(2) Immediate precursors to
phencyclidine (PCP):
(i) 1-phenylcyclohexylamine—7460
(ii) 1-piperidinocyclohexanecarbonitrile
(PCQ-eeo3

inventory pursuant to i i 1304.11-1304.19
of Title 21 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, of all stocks of such
substance on hand on February 11, I960.
5. Records. All registrants required to
keep records pursuant to f § 1304.211304.27 of Title 21 of the Code of Federal
Regulations shall maintain such records
on phenyiacetone commencing on the
date on which the inventory of such
substance is taken.
Effective Dates
6. Reports. All registrants required to
1. Registration. Any person who
file reports with the Drug Enforcement
manufactures, distributes, dispenses,
Administration pursuant to SI 1304.37imports or exports pherlyacetone or
1304.41 of Title 21 of the Code of Federal
who proposes to engage in such
Regulations shall report on the inventory
activities, shall submit an application
taken under paragraph 4 above and on
for registration to conduct such
all subsequent transactions.
activities in accordance with Parts 1301
7. Order Forms. The order form
and 1311 of Title 21 of the Code of
Federal Regulations on or before
requirements of 55 1305.01-1305.16 of
February 11,1960. Applications for
Tide 21 of the Code of Federal
registration should be sent by registered Regulations shall be in effect on the date
mail, return receipt requested, to: United which the initial inventory of this
States Department of Justice, Drug
Schedule II controlled substance is
Enforcement Administration,
taken, March 11,1960.
Registration Section, P.O. Box 23083,
8. Quotas. Quotas shall be established
Central Station, Washington, D.C. 20005.
in 1960 for phenyiacetone pursuant to
2. Security. Phenyiacetone must be
S S 1303.01-1303.37 of Title 11 of the
manufactured, distributed and stored in Code of Federal Regulations.
accordance with | { 1301.71,1301.72(a),
Applications for procurement quotas
(c), and (d), 1101.73,1301.74(aHO.
and manufacturing quotas should be
1301.75{bKc) and 1301.76 of Title 21 of
submitted
not later than February 11,
the Code of Federal Regulations on or
before June 12, I960. From now until the 196a
9. Importation and Exportation. All
effective date of this provision, it is
importation and exportation of
expected that manufacturers and
phenyiacetone shall, on or after
distributors of phenyiacetone will
February 11,1980, be required to be in
initiate whatever preparations as may
compliance with Part 1312 of Title 21 of
be necessary, including undertaking
handling and engineering studies and
the Code of Federal Regulations.
construction programs, in order to
10. Criminal Liability. The
provide adequate security for
Administrator, Drug Enforcement
phenyiacetone in accordance with DEA Administration, hereby orders that any
regulations so that substantial
activity with respect to phenyiacetone
compliance with this provision can be
as a Schedule II controlled substance
met by June 12,1960. In the event that
not authorized by, or in violation of, the
this imposes special hardships, the Drug Controlled Substances Act or the
Enforcement Administration will
Controlled Substances Import and
entertain any justified requests for
Export
Act, conducted after February 11,
extensions of time.
1960, shall be unlawful, except that any
3. Labeling and Packaging. All labels person who is not now registered to
on commercial containers of, and all
handle phenyiacetone as a Schedule II
labeling of phenyiacetone packaged
after June 12, I960, shall comply with the controlled substance but who is entitled
to registration under such Acts may
requirements of JJ 1302.03-1302.05 a.id
1302 08 of Title 21 of the Code of Federal continue to conduct normal business or
professional practice with
Regulations. In the event this effective
phenyiacetone between the date on
date imposes special hardships on any
which this Order is published and the
manufacturer, as defined in Section
102(14) of the Controlled Substances Act date which he obtains or is denied
registration: provided, that application
(21 U.S.C 802(14)), the Drug
for such registration is submitted on or
Enforcement Administration will
before February 11,1980,
entertain any justified requests for an
extension of time.
11. Other In all other respects, this
4. inventory. Every registrant required Order is effective February 11,1980.
to keep records who possesses any
quantity of phenyiacetone shall take an

Dated: December 7,1979.
Peter B. Bentinftr,

Administrator, Drug Enforcement
Administration*
(FR Doe. 79-mU PlUd 13-11-7* MS tm]
•tUMO COM 4410-0**

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND
URBAN DEVELOPMENT
Offte* of Assistant Secretary for
Housing—Fsderal Housing
Commfssionar
24 CFR Part 207
[Docket Mc. R-79-754J

Amsndrosnts to Part 207 To Changs
the Minimum Number of Units
Required for Projects Insured Under
Section 207 of the National Housing
Act

AGENCY: Department of Housing and
Urban Development, Office of the
Assistant Secretary for HousingFederal Housing Commissioner.
ACTION: Final rule.
SUMMARY: Sections 207.24 (a) and (b)
and 20732a of Subpart A are being
amended to reflect the change from 8 to
5 in the minimum number of units
required for projects insured under
section 207 of the National Housing Act
as authorized by the Housing and
Community Development Amendments
of 1978.
EPFtCTIVf DATt: January 2,1880.
ADORESS: Rules Docket Clerk, Office of
the General Counsel Room 5218,
Department of Housing and Urban
Development, 451 Seventh Street SW„
Washington, D.C 20410.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

George O. Hipps, Jr., Office of
Multifamily Housing Development
Room 8128,451 Seventh Street SW„
Washington, D.C. 20410; Phone: (202)
755-5720. (This is not a toll free number.)
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: S e c t i o n

207 of the National Housing Act has
required that a multifamily project or a
mobile home park have a minimum of
eight units to be eligible for mortgage
insurance. This minimum number was
changed to five by the Housing and
Commuaity Development Amendments
of 1978 enacted October 27,197a With
this change, proposed projects of 5, 8,
and 7 units will be eligible for mortgage
insurance. Existing multifamily
apartment housing projects of five to
seven units will also be eligible under
Part 207 pursuant to section 223(f) of the
National Housing Act.
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration

Administration. Washington. DC 20537.
Telephone: (202) 633-1366.

elsewhere in this issue of the Federal
Register.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

(a J Transfer of FDA Approved
Dronabinol'Drug
Products From
Schedule I to Schedule II

21 CFR Part 1308

List of Subjects in 21 C F R Part 1308

Schedules of Controlled Substances:
Rescheduling of Synthetic Dronabinol
in Sesame Oil and Encapsulated in
Soft Gelatin Capsules From Schedule I
to Schedule II; Statement of Policy

Administrative practice and
procedure. Drug traffic control.
N a r c o t i c s , P r e s c r i p t i o n drugs.
A p r o p o s e d rule w a s p u b l i s h e d n
Federal Register o n O c t o b e r 18. 1985 (50
FR 42Uih-42187). p r o p o s i n g that
d r o n a b i n o l in sesame o i l a n d
e n c a p s u l a t e d m soft g e l a t i n ' c a p s u l e s in
a d r u g p r o d u c t a p p r o v e d by the U.S.
F o o d a n d D r u g A d m i n i s t r a t i o n be
t r a n s f e r r e d f r o m S c h e d u l e I to S c h e d u l e
II of the C o n t r o l l e d S u b s t a n c e s A c t (21
VI S.C. 801 et s e q ) . C o n c u r r e n t l y , a
proposal was published which proposed
changes in p r o t o c o l r e q u i r e m e n t s for
researchers and prescription
r e q u i r e m e n t s for p r a c t i t i o n e r s (50 FR
42184-42186} I n t e r e s t e d persons w e r e
g i v e n u n t i l N o v e m b e r 16, 1985. to s u b m i t
c o m m e n t s or o b j e c t i o n s r e g a r d i n g each
of the p r o p o s a l s .

AGENCY: Drug Enforcement
Administration. Justice.
ACTION. Final Rule and Statement of
Policy.
SUMMARY: This final rule is issued by
the A d m i n i s t r a t o r s ! the Drug
Enforcement Administration (UFA) to
transfer U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) approved drug
products that consist ot synthetic
dronabinol in sesame oil encapsulated
in soft gelatin capsules from Schedule I
into Schedule (I of the Controlled
Substances Act (CSA) Dronabinol is the
svnihetic equivalent of the isomer of
d e l t a s -tetrahydrocannabinol (CMC)
which is the principal psychoactive
substance in (Umtuibis sutiu: L
marijuana. This action is based mi a
finding that U.S. Food and Drug
Administration approved drug products
which contain dronabinol fit the
statutory criteria for ini lusion in
Schedule II of the CSA. As ,» lesult of
this rule, the regulatory controls and
criminal sanctions of Schedule II of the
CSA will apply to the manufacture,
distribution, importation and
exportation of dronabinol
pharmaceutical products. This rule does
not affect the Schedule1 I status of any
other substance, mixture or preparation
which is currently included in 21 CFR
i:H)B.ll(d)(21). Tetrahydrocannabinols.
The Administrator herein also issues a
statement of policy regarding review,
under the public interest criteria of 21
U.S.C. 823(f) and 824(a)(4). of the DEA
registrations of practitioners who
distribute or dispense dronabinol for
purposes at variance with the FDA
approved indications for use of the
approved product. A notice is published
elsewhere in this isue of the Federal
Register that v Sdraws the proposed
rule entitled Cn.mges in Protocol
Requirements for Researchers and
Prescription Requirements for
Practitioners (50 FR 42184-42180.
October 18, 1985).
EFFECTIVE DATE: M a y VX 1980
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Howard McClain. Jr.. Chief Drug
Control Section. Office of Diversion
Control. Drug Enforcement

T h i r t e e n i n d i v i d u a l s or o r g a n i z a t i o n s
a v a i l e d t h e m s e l v e s of the o p p o r t u n i t y to
c o m m e n t , o b j e c t or request a-n
administrative hearing, T w o '
o r g a n i z a t i o n s . C a n n a b i s C o r p o r a t i o n of
A m e r i c a a n d N a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n for
the R e f o r m of M a r i j u a n a L a w s
( N O R M l . J . r e q u e s t e d h e a r i n g s . Both
r e q u e s t s for h e a r i n g s w e r e s u b s e q u e n t l y
w i t h d r a w n . C o m m e n t s or o b j e c t i o n s
w e r e s u b m i t t e d by or on b e h a l f of the
f o l l o w i n g : A l l i a n c e for C a n n a b i s
Therapeutics, A m e r i c a n C o l l e g e of
Neuropsychopharmacology. American
Medical Association. American
Pharmaceutical Association. Arkansas
D e p a r t m e n t of H e a l t h , C o m m i t t e e o n
P r o b l e m s of D r u g D e p e n d e n c e . Inc., M r .
A n s i s M . H e l m a n i s . the l a w offices o f
K l e i n f e l d . K a p l a n a n d Becker. M a r c o s A .
S. L i m a , M l ) . , H . C. Pars P h a r m a c e u t i c a l
L a b o r a t o r i e s a n d the P h a r m a c e u t i c a l
Manufacturers Association.
H a v i n g c o n s i d e r e d the c o m m e n t s a n d
o b j e c t i o n s p r e s e n t e d b y the a b o v e l i s t e d
p a r t i e s , the r e q u i r e m e n t s of the
C o n t r o l l e d S u b s t a n c e s A c t a n d the
C o n v e n t i o n on Psychotropic Substances
( T . I . A S . 9725. July 15, 1980). the
A d m i n i s t r a t o r has d e c i d e d (a) to
p r o c e e d w i t h the r e s c h e d u l i n g of
d r o n a b i n o l as p r o p o s e d at 50 FR 4218042187 a n d ( b | to issue a s t a t e m e n t of
p o l i c y r e g a r d i n g r e v i e w of the
d i s t r i b u t i o n or d i s p e n s i n g of d r o n a b i n o l
by practitioner registrants w h i c h
d e v i a t e s f r o m a p p r o v e d m e d i c a l use to
i n s u r e c o m p l i a n c e w i t h the o b l i g a t i o n s
o f the U n i t e d States as a s i g n a t o r y to the
C o n v e n t i o n on Psychotropic Substances.
The p r e v i o u s l y p r o p o s e d r e g u l a t i o n s
r e l a t i n g to d r o n a b i n o l are w i t h d r a w n

Having considered the comments and
objections presented by the above listed
parties and based on the investiga'ions
and review of the Drug Enforcement
Administration, with attention to the
obligations of the United States under
the Convention on Psychotropic
Substances, and relying on the scientific
and medical evaluation and
recommendation of the Assistant
Secretary for Health of the Department
of Health and Human Services, acting
on behalf of the Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human
Services, in accordance with 21 U.S.C.
811(b). and the Food and Drug
Administration approval of a new drug
application for Marinol capsules, the
Administrator of the Drug Enforcement
Administration, pursuant to the
provision- .T21 U.S.C. 811(a). finds that:
1 Droi
>1 (synthetic) in sesame oil
and enca:'
t in soft gelatin
capsules ;>,
Food and Drug
AdniinisOatc. qiproved drug product
has a high potential for abuse:
2. Dronabinol (synthetic) in sesame oil
and encapsulated in soft gelatin
capsules in a U.S. Food and Drug
Administration approved drug product
has a currently accepted medical use in
treatment in the United States or a
currently accepted medical use with
seven 1 restrictions, and
:\ Dronabinol (synthetic) in sesame oil
and encapsulated in soft gelatin
capsules in a U.S. Food and Drug
Administration approved drug product
may lead to severe psychological or
physical dependence.
The above findings are consistent
with placement of dronabinol approved
drug products into Schedule II of the
CSA. The transfer of the product from
Schedule t to Schedule II is effective on
May 13. 1986 with selected
implementation dates as indicated. In
the event that this imposes special
hardships on any registrant, the Drug
Enforcement Administration will
entertain any justified request for an
extention of time to comply with the
Schedule II regulations. The applicable
regulations are as follows:
1. Registration. Any person who
manufactures, distributes, delivers,
imports or exports a FDA approved
dronabinol drug product, or who
engages tn research or conducts
instructional activities with such a
substance must be registered to conduct
such activities in accordance with Parts

17471
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FR 13193), this stat
nt of policy has
been submitted foi . <ew by the Office
of Management and Budget. In
accordance with the provisions of 21
U.S.C. 811(a). this order to reschedule
certain drug products which contain
synthetic dronabinol from Schedule I to
Schedule II is a formal rulemaking "on
the record after opportunity for a
hearing." Such proceedings are
conducted pursuant to the provisions of
5 U.S.C. 556 and 557 and as such have
been exempted from the consultation
requirements of Executive Order 12291.
Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the
Administrator certifies that the
rescheduling of formulations which
contain dronabinol, as ordered herein,
will not have a significant impact upon
small businesses or oilier entities whose
interests must be considered under the
Regulatory Flexibility Act (Pub. L. 90354. September 19. 1980). This action
will allow the marketing of a drug
product which has been approved bv the
FDA.
Pursuant to the authority vested in the
Attorney General by section 201(a) of
theCSA(21 U.S.C. 811(a)|. as
redelegated to the Administrator of the
Drug Enforcement Administration by 28
CFR 0.100. and for the reasons set forth
above, the Administrator hereby orders
that 21 CFR 1308.12 be amended as
follows:
PART 1308—(AMENDED 1

1. The authority citation for 21 CFR
Part 1308 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 21 U.S.C. 811. 812. 871(b).
2. 21 CFR 1308.12 is amended by
redesignating the existing paragraph (f)
as paragraph (g) and by adding a new
paragraph (f). reading as follows:
§1308.12 Scheduled.

•

•

*

«

(f) Halluci'nogrnic

*
substances.

\\) Dronabinol (synthetic) in sesame oil
and encapsulated in d soft gelatin
capsule in a U.S. Food and Drug
Administration approved drug
product
7369
(Some other names- for dronabinol: (6a/?
/ro/f.s")-6a.7.8.10a-tetrahydro-6.fl.9 trimethyI-3pentyl-6//-dibenzo(/u/)pyran 1 ol or ( )-de!ta
9 (trans) tetrahydrocannabinol)

*

*

*

*

*

Dated: May 1. 1986.
John C. Lawn,
Administrator, Unix* Enfarcvnwnt
Administration.

|FR Doc. 86-10724 Filed 5-12-86; 8.45 am|
WltHQ
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DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

the Indiana program are identified in 30
CFR 914.15 and 30 CFR 914.16.

Office of Surface Mining Reclamation
and Enforcement

IK Discussion of Proposed Amendment

30 CFR Part 914
Approval of Permanent Program
Amendments From the State of
Indiana Under the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977
AGENCY: Office of Surface Mining
Reclamation and Enforcement (OSMRE).
interior.

ACTION: Final rule.
SUMMARY: OSMRE is announcing the
appproval of amendments to the Indiana
Permanent Regulatory Program
(hereinafter referred to as the Indiana
program) received by OSMRE pursuant
to the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA).
On January 31.1986, Indiana
submitted amendments to its program
requirements regarding civil penalties,
incidental boundary revisions and use of
explosives.
After providing opportunity for public
comment and conducting a thorough
review of the program amendments, the
Director. OSMRE. has determined that
the amendments meet the requirements
of SMCRA and the Federal regulations.
Accordingly, the Director is approving
these amendments. The Federal rules at
30 Part 914 which codify decisions
concerning the Indiana program are
being amended to implement this action.
This final rule is being made effective
immediately in order to expedite the
State program amendment process and
encourage States to conform their
programs to the Federal standards
without undue delay; consistency of the
State and Federal standards is required
by SMCRA.
EFFECTIVE OATE: May 13. 1986
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Mr. Richard D. Rieke. Director.
Indianapolis Field Office, Office of
Surface Mining Reclamation and
Enforcement. Federal Building and U.S.
Courthouse, Room 522, 46 East Ohio
Street. Indianapolis, Indiana 46204.
Telephone: (317) 269-2600.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
Information regarding the general
background on the Indiana State
program, including the Secretary's
findings, the disposition of comments
and a detailed explanation of the
conditions of approval of the Indiana
program can hn. found in the July 26,
1982 Federal Register (47 FR 3207132108). Subsequent actions concerning

On January 31,1986, the Indiana
Department of Natural Resources
submitted to OSMRE pursuant to 30 CFR
732.17, proposed State program
amendments for approval
(Administrative Record No. IND 0453).
The amendments modify requirements
for civil penalty assessments, incidental
boundary revisions and use of
explosives.
OSMRE published a notice in the
Federal Register on February 26.1986.
announcing receipt of the proposed
program amendments and procedures
for the public comment period and for
requesting a public hearing on the
substantive adequacy of the proposed
amendments (51 FR 6751). The public
comment period ended March 28. 1986.
There was nc request for a public
hearing and the hearing scheduled for
March 24. 1986. was not held.
III. Director's Findings
The Director finds, in accordance with
SMCRA and 30 CFR 732.15 and 732.17,
that the program amendments submitteci
by Indiana on January 31,1986. meet the
requirements of SMCRA and 30 CFR
Chapter VII. Only those areas of
particular interest are discussed below
in the specific findings. Discussion of
only those provisions for which findings
are made does not imply any deficiency
in any provisions not discussed.
Civil Penalties
Indiana has amended 310 IAC 12-6-11
to provide that the regulatory authority
shall assess a penalty for a violation
which leads to a cessation order and for
notices of violation assigned 31 points or
more under the point system established
in 310 IAC 12-6-12.5. The rule provides
that the regulatory authority may assess
a penalty for 30 points or less. Under the
rule, a penalty of $5000 per day shall be
assessed for mining without a permit,
except under certain circumstances.
Indiana has amended 310 IAC 12-6-12
to establish the requirements foj
assigning points for penalties based on
certain factors. The factors to be
considered are: The permittee's history
of violations at the particular operation
(up to 30 points); the seriousness of the
violation for which the penalty is being
assessed (up to 15 points); the degree of
the permittee's negligence or fault in the
violation (up to 25 points); and degree of
good faith determined from the
permittees efforts to abate the violation
(up to negative 30 points).

2°l

Title 21—Food Wnl

« w w * • m.
(6) 3.4 - methytenedioxy a/nphetamlne..

7400

(/) 3,4.5-trimethoxy amphetamine

7390

(8) Bufoienine
Some trade and other names: 3 - (/J - CMmethylaminoetbyi)- 5 - hydroxyindole; 3(2-dimethylaminoethyl) - 5 - indoW; N. N dimethylserotonin; 5 - hydroxy - N.N - dimetrtyttryptamine; mappine.

7433

(9) Diethyltryptamine...
Some trade and other names: N.N-Diethyttryptamine; DET.
(10) Dimethyftryptamine..
Some trade or other names: DMT.
(11) Ibogaioe...
Some trade and other names: 7 - Ethyl 6.6/3.7.8.9,10.12.13 - octahydro - 2 methoxy-6,9-methano-5H-pyrido
[ 1'.
2": 1.2J azepino [5.4-b] indole; Tabernanthe iboga.

7435
7260

(1) mecfoqualone

(12) Lysergic acid diethylamide

7315

(13) Marihuana

7360

(14) Mescaline
(15) Peyote
Meaning all parts of the plant presently
classified botanicalfy as Lophophora witUamsS Lamaka. whether growing or not,
the seeds thereof, any extract from any
part of such plant, and every compound,
manufacture, salts, derivative, mixture, or
preparation of such plant, its seeds or extracts.
(Interprets 2t OSC 812(c). Schedule 1(c) (12))
(16) N-ethyl-3-piperidyl benzilate

(e) Depressants. Unless specific^
excepted or unless listed m Inri
schedule, any material, com^a
mixture, or preparation witfch*j
tains any quantity of the folio]
substances having a depressant
on the central nervous systemt1ii*n
Ing its salts, isomers, and salts ofj
mers whenever the existence'of
salts, isomers, and salts of jsomi
possible within the specific;
designation:
'

7415

7482

(17) N-methyl-3-piperidyl benzilate...

7484

(18) Psitocybin

7437

(19)PsHocyn

7438

(20) Tetrahydrocannabinols
Synthetic equivalents of the substances
contained In the plant or in the resinous
extractives of Cannabis, sp. and/or synthetic substances, derivatives, and their
isomers with similar chemical structure
and pharmacological activity such as the
following:
A1 ois or trans tetrahydrocannabinol, and
their optical isomers.
A6 cis or trans tetrahydrocannabinol, and
their optical isomers.
A3.4 cis or trans tetrahydrocannabinol, and
its optical isomers.
(Since nomenclature of these substances is
not internationally standardized, compounds of these structures, regardless of
numerical designation of atomic positions
covered.)
(21) Ethytamine analog of phencyclidine
Some trade of other names: N-ethyl-1phenylcyclohexyiamine,
(\ phonylcyclohexyl)«thvlamine,
N-( 1 phenylcyclohoxyljethylamine, cyclohexamine, PCE.
{22) Pyrrolidine analog of phencyclidine
Some trade or othor names. 1-(1-ph«nylcy.
clobexyO-pyrrolidlne. PCPy. PHP.
(23) Thiophene analog of phencyclidine
Some trade or other names: 1-(1-(2thienyt)<yclorwxvl)-piperidine.
2-thienylanalog of phencyclidine. TPCP, TCP.

7370

7458

7470

„

SUi'

t39 FR 22141, June 20, 1974, ai __
40 FR 19813, May 7, 1975; 40 FR 2WliT
8, 1975; 41 FR 4016, Jan. 28, lOTfcbll
43401. Oct. 1, 1976; 42 FR lHrifyUmirt
1977; 43 FR 43295, Sspt.25, 19781 -

§1308.12 Schedule II.
"^"^KL-.
(a) Schedule II shall c o n s i s t ^ ® f | |
drugs and other substances, jt>i_
ever official name, commonVtSjf
name, chemical name, or braria
designated, listed in this section?
drug or substance has bee: "
the Controlled Substani
Number set forth opposite i t
(b) Substances, vegetable
chemical synthesis. Unless specif!
excepted or unless listed ln-»T
schedule, any of the following??!
stances whether produced
indirectly by extraction from
stances of vegetable origin, orAni
dently by means of chemical?*:
sis. or by a combination ofiexfr^
and chemical synthesis:
- -*8jfjw»}
(1) Opium and opiate, and any I J ^ j
compound, derivative, or pr^pari*™?*
of opium or opiate, excludmgfipoi
phine, dextrorphan, nalbuphine*
loxone, and naltrexone, and^thclf^fS^
spective salts, but including the^fol
ing:
1 Raw opium
2 Opium extracts
3 Opium fluid extracts
4 Powdered opium
5 Granulated opium
6 Tincture of opium
7 Codeine
8 Ethytmorphine
9 Etorphine hydrochloride
10 Hydrocodone
11 Hydromorphone
12 Metopon
13 Morphine
M Oxycodone
15 Oxymorphone

sajt. compound, derivative,
itlon thereof which is chemiHvalent or identical with any
••substances referred to In para•%fo"U) of this section, except
hese substances shall not include
rjulnbline alkaloids of opium.
fOpiiltti poppy and poppy straw.
ypbe^ leaves (9040) and any salt,
fid, derivative, or preparation
'leaves, and any salt, comJerivative, or preparation
Men is chemically equivalent
_ilfcal with any of these suba^^ccept that the substances
include decocainlzed coca
for extraction of coca leaves.
__ ^extractions do not contain coR;(9041) or ecgonine (9180).
i CftHcentrate of poppy straw (the
felfe^ffact of poppy straw in either
6i$SQiid or powder form which
_ in84he phenanthrine alkaloids of
iopiurn poppy), 9670.
Ih^Oplates. Unless specifically exfeiShunless
In another schedule
Rjfjjpw following opiates, Including
ibomers, esters, ethers, salts and
liJjpf.Tsomers, esters and ethers
tfjfi? the existence of such Iso" ers, ethers, and salts is possii/the specific chemical desig£dextrorphan excepted:

,

,
—

mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of the following
substances having a Stimulant effect
on the central nervous system:
(1) Amphetamine, its salts, optical isomers, and
salts of its optical isomers
(2) Methamphetamine. its salts, iso- mers. and
salts of its isomers
(3) Phenmetrazine and its salts
(4) MethylphenkJate
—

WntemvKfiate-B, ethyM-phenytpi•oxylate
• Intermediate • C, 1-methyl- 4 •
- 4 -carboxytec acid
•7
—"-—

(1) AmooarbHal
~
(2) Methaqualone
(3) Pentobarbital
(4) PhencyclirJne
(5) Phencyclidine immediate precursors:
(a) 1-phenyk*dcte>rylamine
(b)
1-pip«ioTncKjyclc^exariec»rbon«rile(PCC)
(6) Secobarbital

0010
0020
9800
9120
9170
9801
9226
9210
9220
9240

9254
9802
9230
9232
9233
9234
9715
9730
g732
9733

hfifbnulants.
Unless specifically
or unless listed in another
any material, compound.

lOThebaine

86

1105
1831
1724

(e) Depressants. Unless specifically
excepted or unless listed in another
schedule, any material, compound,
mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of the following
substances having a depressant effect
on the central nervous system, including its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers whenever the existence of such
salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is
possible within the specific chemical
designation:

9250

Intermediate. 4-cyano-2-dimeth4,4-d^henyi butane
iwe-lntermediate, 2-methyl-3-morpbol^'dip^Mnylprc^ne-cartoxyticacid
"" Tnejfmeperidine)
"~ ^Intermediate-A, 4-cyano-1 -methyl. .wrkjme

1100

87

2125
2585
2270
7471
7460
8603
2315

[39 FR 22142, June 20, 1974, as amended at
40 FR 6780, Feb. 14, 1975; 40 FR 10456, Mar.
6, 1975; 41 FR 26568, June 28, 1976; 41 FR
43401, Oct. 1. 1976; 42 FR 15680, Mar. 23,
1977; 43 FR 21325. May 17, 19781
§1308.13

Schedule III.

(a) Schedule III shall consist of the
drugs and other substances, by whatever official name, common or usual
name, chemical name, or brand name
designated, listed in this section. Each
drug or substance has been assigned
the DEA Controlled Substances Code
Number set forth opposite it.
(b) Stimulants.
Unless specifically
excepted or unless listed in another
schedule, any material, compound,
mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of the following
substances having a stimulant effect
on the central nervous system, including its salts, isomers (whether optical,
position, or geometric), and salts of
such isomers whenever the existence
of such salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is possible within the specific
chemical designation:

TitU 21—food and

§1308.11
(40) Properidine
(41) Proplram
(42) Racemoramide..
(43) Trimeperidine

„

(5) 4 - methyl -2.5 - dimethoxy - amphetamine.
Some trade and other names: 4 - methyl 2,5
dlmethoxy-e
methylphenethylamine;
"DOM";
and
"STP"

9644
9640
9845
9646

(c) Opium derivatives. Unless specifically excepted or unless listed In
another schedule, any of the following
opium derivatives, Its salts. Isomers,
and salts of Isomers whenever the existence of such salts, isomers, and salts
of isomers Is possible within the specific chemical designation:
(1) Acetorphine
(2) Ac^yWihydrocodeJne
(3) Benzylmorphine
(4) Codeine methytjromide...
(5) Codeine NOxide
(6) Cyprenorphine
(7) Desomorphine
(8) l>»iydrc>o»orphine
(9) Drotebanol
_

9319
9051
9052
9070
9053
9054
9055
9145
9335

(10) Etorphlne (except hydrochloride salt)...
(11) Heroin
(12) Hydromorphinol...
(13) MethyWesorphine
(14) MettiyldihydrorrKKpbine
(15) Morphine methytjromide
(16) Morphine methylsuffonate...

9056
9200
930!
9302
9304
9305
9306

(17) Morphine-N-Oxide
(18) Myrophine
(19) Nicocodeine
(20) Nicomorphine
(21) Norrnorphine
(22) Pholcodine
(23) Thebacon

9307
9306
9309
9312
9313
9314
9315

(6) 3,4 • methyfenedioxy amphetamine
(7) 3,4,5-lrimerhoxy amphetamine

(9) Dietrtyttryptamine
Some trade and other names: N.N-CHelbyitryptamine: DET.
(10) Ometrtyttryptamine
Some trade or other names: DMT.
(11) loogaine
Some trade and other names: 7 • Ethyl •
8.60.7.8.9,10.12.13 • octahydro - 2 rnethoxy-6.9Hfnethano-5H-pyhdo
H\ .
2': 1.21 azepino [5.4-bl indole: Tabernanthetboga.
(12) Lysergic acid diethylamide
(13) Marihuana

7391

(2) 2.5-dimethojryamphelafnine
Some trade or other names: 2.5 • dimethoxy
- a - metftylphenetnytamine; 2,5-OMA.
(3) 4 methoxyampbetamine
Some trade or other names: 4-methoxy a methylphenethytamine;
paramethoxyamphetarnine. PMA.
(4) 5 - methoxy • 3.4 • metnytenedtoxy- amphetamine

7396

„

(14) Mescaline
(15) Peyote
»
Meaning at) parts of the plant presently
classified botanicaUy as Lophophorm w0Hams* Lemaira, whether growing or not
the seeds thereof, any extract from any
part of such plant, and every compound,
manufacture, salts, derivative, mixture, or
preparation of such plant, its seeds or extracts.
(Interprets 21 USC 812(c). Schedule 1(c) (12))
(16) N^thyt-3-pipendyl benzMate

(d)
Hallucinogenic
substances.
Unless specifically excepted or unless
listed In another schedule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation,
which contains any quantity of the
following hallucinogenic substances,
or which contains any of its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers whenever
the existence of such salts. Isomers,
and salts of Isomers Is possible within
the specific chemical designation (for
purposes of this paragraph only, the
term "isomer" includes the optical, position and geometric isomers):
(1) 4-brorrx>2.5-dimethoxy- amphetamine
Some bade or other names: 4 - bromo • 2.5
• dimethoxy • a-methyfptienethylamine; 4bromo-2.5-DMA.

....

(8) Butotenme
„
Some trade and other names: 3 - (fl - DH
methytaminoethyt)- 5 - hydroxyindole; 3(2 rjlmethytaminoethyt) • 5 - Indotor; N. N •
dimethylserotonin; 5 - hydroxy - N.N - rSrnetrryttryptamine; mappine.

..

(17) N-methyl-3-piperldyt benzftate
(18) Psftocybin
(19)PsHocyn
(20) Tetrahydrocannabinols
Synthetic equivalents of the substances
contained in the plant, or in the resinous
extractives of Cannabis, sp. and/or synthetic substances, derivatives, and their
isomers with similar chemical structure
and pharmacological activity such as the
following^
At cis or trans tetrahydrocannabinol, and
their optical isomers.
A6 cis or trans tetrahydrocannabinol, and
their optical isomers.
A3.4 ois or trans tetrahydrocannabinol, and
Its optical isomers.
(Since nomenclature of these substances is
not internationally standardized, compounds of these structures, regardless of
numerical designation of atomic positions
covered.)
(21) Ethytamine analog of phencyctidine
Some trade of other names: N-ethyf-1phenylcyckJhexylamine.
(1phenylcyclohexyt>triylamine.
N-(1r*>enyW^dohexyf)ethytamine, cyclohexamine. PCE.
(22) PyrrotirJne analog of phencycBdine
Some trade or other names: 1-(1-phenvlcvck>hexyl)-pyn-olldine. PCPy. PHP.

7411

7401

84

PSipfor II—Drug Enforcement Admin., Dopt. of Justice
|i^23) Thiophene analog of phencyclidJne
*%. Some trade or other names: 1 - t M J (pT; f^enylHYctonexylJplperidine. 2-thieny.
IgfM tanalog of phencycldlne. TPCP. TCP.

7470
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13 Morphine
14 Oxycodone
15 Oxymorphone...
16 Thebaine.

9300
9143
9652
9333

'--t*v
ZS&fi} Depressants. Unless specifically (2) Any salt, compound, derivative,
Excepted or unless listed in another or preparation thereof which Is chemiJscljedule. any material, compound, cally equivalent or Identical with any
Iftxture, or preparation which con- of the substances referred to in paraSains any quantity of the following graph (b) (1) of this section, except
instances having a depressant effect that these substances shall not Include
£rj, the central nervous system, includ- the Isoqulnollne alkaloids of opium.
(3) Opium poppy and poppy straw.
ing its salts, isomers, and salts of lso(4) Coca leaves (9040) and any salt,
Kera whenever the existence of such
compound,
derivative, or preparation
Sits* Isomers, and salts of Isomers Is
•possible within the specific chemical of coca leaves, and any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation
^designation:
thereof which is chemically equivalent
or identical with any of these subS f FR 22141, June 20. 1974, as amended at stances, except that the substances
m FR 19813. May 7, 1975; 40 Fit 28611, July shall not include decocainized coca
i^l»75; 41 FR 4016. Jan. 28. 1976; 41 PR
334D1. Oct. 1, 1976; 42 FR 15679, Mar. 23. leaves or extraction of coca leaves,
which extractions do not contain co3977; 43 FR 43295, Sept. 25. 19781
caine (9041) or ecgonine (9180).
11308.12 Schedule II.
(5) Concentrate of poppy straw (the
(a) Schedule II shall consist of the crude extract of poppy straw in either
drugs and other substances, by what- liquid, solid or powder form which
ever official name, common or usual contains the phenanthrene alkaloids
name, chemical name, or brand name of the opium poppy), 9670.
(c) Opiates. Unless specifically exdesignated, listed in this section. Each
drug or substance has been assigned cepted or unless in another schedule
the Controlled Substances Code any of the following opiates, including
its isomers, esters, ethers, salts and
Jfiiimber set forth opposite it.
rtjb) Substances, vegetable origin or salts of isomers, esters and ethers
^chemical synthesis. Unless specifically whenever the existence of such Iso[excepted or unless listed In another mers, esters, ethers, and salts is possischedule, any of the following sub- ble within the specific chemical desigstances whether produced directly or nation, dextrorphan excepted:
Indirectly by extraction from sub- (1) AlphaprooVie
9010
stances of vegetable origin, or indepen- (2) AnHeridine
9020
dently by means of chemical synthe- (3) Bentramide
9800
9120
sis, or by a combination of extraction (4) Oihydrocodeme
(5)
Diphenoxylate
9170
and chemical synthesis:
Fentanyt
9001
mil) Opium and opiate, and any salt, (6)
(7)
teomethadone.
9226
compound, derivative, or preparation (8) Levomethorphan.
9210
&$ opium or opiate, excluding apomor- (9) Levorphanol
9220
.. .
9240
t>hlhe, dextrorphan, nalbuphine, na- (10) Metazodne
loxone, and naltrexone, and their re- (11) Methadone
9250
(12)
Methadone-lntermediate.
4-cyanc-2-o1methspective salts, but including the followylamino-4.4-diphenyl butane
9254
ing:
£«sw opium
|20f*jm exfracts
|3 Opium fluid extracts
^Powdered opium
S Granulated optum
ffTftcture of opwm
^Codeine
!*Ethylmorphine
^tEtorpftneftydrocnlorlde
LWHydrocodone
^'Hydromorphone
||ZM«topon

9600
9610
9620
©639
9640
9630
9050
9190
9059
9193
9150
9260
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(13) Moramide-Intermediate, 2-mothyl-3-morphofino-1.1 -dtrjhenytrjrc^ane-arboxyic add
(14) Pethidine (meperidine)
(15) Pethidine-Jntermedtote-A. 4-cyano-1-metnyf4-phenytpipsrtrJne..„
(16) Pethidine-lntermerJate-B. ethyt-4-phenytpiperKJine-4-csrboxytate
(17) Pethidine - Intermediate - C. 1-methyt- 4 phenyipipertrjne- 4 -carboxytic acid
(18) Phenazodne
(19) Pxninodine
(20) Racemethorphan
(21) Racemorphan

9802
9230
9232
9233
9234
9715
9730
9732
9733
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(d) Stimulants. Unless specifically
excepted or unless listed in another
schedule, any material, compound,
m xture, or preparation which contains any quantity of the following
substances having a stimulant effect
on the central nervous system:
**lts of its optical ieomani

uoo

Mft» of its Isomers
(3) Pfienmetrazine and its salts
(«> Meihytphenldate

1105
1631
1724

(e) Depressants. Unless specifically
excepted or unless listed in another
schedule, any material, compound,
mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of the following
substances.having a depressant effect
on the central nervous system, including Its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers whenever the existence of such
salts, isomers, and salts of foomers is
Possible within the specific chemical
designation:
CI) Amobarbrtal
(2) Methaquatone...
(3) Pantobartjital
(4) PhencydWina....
(5) Secobarbital

2125

2565
2270

-~

7471
2315

;

nif/i \mmediate
Precursors. Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another
schedule.
any
material
w Z ^ n " ^ l m l x t u r e - o r Preparation
which contains any quantity of the following substances:
(1) Immediate precursor to amphetamine and methamphetamine:
(1) Phenylacetone—8501
Some trade or other names: phenyl-2propanone; P2P; benzyl methyl ketone: methyl benzyl ketone:
clid 2 ine^CP)f G

PreCUrsors to

Phency-

(i) l-phenylcycIohexylamlne-7460

trile ?

P

434M1 'rt\ *?

risk &™2 iim

'

June

28

. ^ 7 6 ; 41 PR

M y IZ I978:

*

Schedule

" **

(II

(a) Schedule Hi „»_.,
.
^^
consIst
drugs and other l8^11
°fti£
u
ever official n i * * £ ^
***$%
name, chemical r,*V, c o m m ? n °r usutj
designated. listed J ^ f i ^ J M ^ i
drug or s u b s t a n c i ^ i l K SeCtIott ^ * «
the DEA Control?J 1 *? }*?n ^ f e n e *
Number set forth
^
t
^
^
(b) Stimulants,^Wf^lt
> f&
excepted or u n ^ ™ ^ f P e d f l c f l
schedule, any S J 5 * ? 1 i n * > « & «
mixture, or prea* Z?*1' rompdiuSg
tains any Q u a ^ U ^ ^
S I
substances h a v i n g o f f I t h e f f°UowlnH
on the central n e L * f 8 t i m u l a n t ; ^ M
Ing its salts. i s o m C ? - , t y S ^ m *
H
position, or geon£f r ^ h e 0 ^ ! r °?5<&1
d
such Isomers w h e ^ ' f ™
^ M B
of such salts.
IsouS™**?™*^
o t
mers is possible t M * ^
m
e
chemical designaU^. n
/ / / Thou compounds, mixture,
in dosage unit form contakv! w P f e P * a t t o " »
•ubatancee feted m ache**? 0 " *
*******
H
pound* mhritiro*
which
comPounds,
mixtures, «#
or ~.~.27
prepar*® H W
^ n COrTV
were
on August 25. 1971. as a x e l ! * * *
^ ^
under f 308.32. and any o ? < e d compounds
ouantrtrve composition sho*J*L * ) * * • » •
tnose drugs or which is thaV * * * < » * « ' < *
H contains a lesaar quantity ? a m e •* C «P 1 f * 1
stancas
„
\ * controlled sub-

1"

*
'N

(c) Depressants. >T *
'*&
excepted or u n l e ^ S S ? p e c , f , ^ 1 ? J
schedule, any m a j1 11 1^ m m«H>tt»«i
mixture, or prepaid ' ^ P o u " n< ^
tains any quantity™™ h eJ*1,f10o*?
~ jj
,lowm
substances having a Z
^
1 effect
on the central n e r v o ^ ^ ?
(!) Any compound, mixture or tv
taining;
"reparation corv

(•) Amobarbrtal....
W Secobarbital...

z;
v

i-&^t # r » , , ~" D r U 9 Snforcom«nt Admin., |> # p t
| ^ n y substance which contains any quantity
V « rjedvatrve of barbituric add or any salt
|0Ct4orha»sdol...
^nGlutathimlde....
g t y s e t g k add...
^ t y ^ n j i c add amide.
MMefhyprylon...
m S^fondiethylmathane..
3 Sutfonathytmethana...

_
„

M

231!

. 2270

or any salt thereof and ona or
ingredients which are not i s t * " * * 0 0 t n 6 r a c t t v * nwdTcW
^d in any schedule.
/ov .
(2) Any suppository dosage form K
0) Amobarbrtal
Containing:
(») Secobarbital
2125
v
(*) Pentobarbital
231$
>
2270or any sail of any of these drug.
and Drug Admhistrs&on torn? , n d •PProved by the Food
fory
a^rtrig onry as a suppose

2100
2510
2550
7300
7310
2575
2600
2605
2«10

j|) Nalorphine 9400.
(Jte) Narcotic Drugs. Unless specif icalepted or unless listed In another
rtule, any material, compound,
Kture, or preparation containing
__/ of the following narcotic drugs, or
_^elr salts calculated as the free anhydrous base or alkaloid, in limited quanSft^s asset forth below:
<1) Not mora than 1.8 grams of codeine per 100
* jnaMHers Of not more than 90 milligrams per
\ rootage unit. wKh an equal or greater quantity
1©1 an tswjJnolne alkatoid of opium

9603

C j Mqtmori than 1.8 grams of codeine par 100
dosage unit, with one or more active, nonnar%btfo ingredwnts in recognized therapeutic
,amounts
_

9604

pfr Not more than 300 mitttgrsms of rjhydroco.rjeinone per 100 maiiliters or not more than 15
.milligrams per dosage unrt, with a fourfold or
"greater quantity of an isoquinolne alkaloid of
Opium
:

9605

(4) Not more than 300 milligrams of dihydroccdeinone per 100 mWHrters or not more than 15
mrHigrams par dosage unit, with one or more
active nonnarcotic ingredients in recognized
therapeutic amounts

(2) Benzphetamine . . . Z Z Z Z ?
(3) CNoiphentarmina....

(4) Oortermine
(5)Maiiodol '['"'.
(6) Phendknatraanc

*" s

^ ^ ^

28568
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-Food ontj J S ^

(5) Not mora than 1.8 grams of dftydrocodeine
par, 100 mWiters or not more than 90 miOi' grams per dosage unit, with one or more
:
active nonnarcotic Ingredients in recognized
therapeutic amounts

9608

i
—

(7) Diazepam
(8) Ethchkxvynol...
(9) Ethinamate...
(10) Flurazepam
(11) Lorazepam
(12) Mebutamate

-

(14) MetnohexNal-.
(15) Methytphenooarbital (inaphobarbital...

(18) Pethchoral
(19) Phenobarbrtal
(20) Prazepam

9810

8>

214S
2400
2465
2744
2737
2760
2765
2540
2545
2767
2685
2800
2620
2264
2250
2835
2585
2591
2265
2764

(d) Fenfluramine.
Any material,
compound, mixture, or preparation
which contains any quantity of the
following substances. Including its
salts, isomers (whether optical, position, or geometric), and salts of such
isomers, whenever the existence of
such salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is possible:
(1) Fenfluramine...

(e) Stimulants. Unless
excepted or unless listed
schedule, any material,
mixture, or preparation

(a) Schedule IV shall consist of the
drugs and other substances, by whatever official name, common or usual

7

(1) Barbital
(2) Chloral betalne
(3) Chloral hydrate
(4) Cotordiazepoxide

(17) Paraldehyde

91308.14 Schedule IV.

0-K>

name, chemical name, or brand name
designated, listed in this section. Each
drug or substance has been assigned
the DEA Controlled Substances Code
Number set forth opposite it.
(b) ZVarcoftc drugs. Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another
schedule, any material, compound,
mixture, or preparation containing
any of the following narcotic drugs, or
their salts calculated as the free anhydrous base or alkaloid, in limited quantities as set forth below:
(1) Not more than 1 milligram of difenoxin (DEA Drug Code No. 9168)
and not less than 25 micrograms of atropine sulfate per dosage unit.
(c) DepressanU. Unless specifically
excepted or unless listed in another
schedule, any material, compound,
mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of the following
_snhstances- Jncludiu*. lte-&alts - Jsometsand salts of Isomers whenever the existence of such salts, isomers, and salts
of isomers is possible within the specific chemical designation:

(16) Oxazepam

(39 FR 22142. June 20. 1074. AS amended at
41 FR 43401, Oct. 1. 1976; 43 FR 3359. Jan.
25, 1978; 44 FR 40888. July 13.19791

40-059
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(13) Meprobamate
9607

(7) Not more than 500 milligrams of Opium per
100 mHWHers or per 100 grams or not more
'than 25 mMgrarns per dosage unit, with one
. rjr- more active, nonnarcotic ingredients in recognized therapeutic amounts

86

jutf|Cf>

(5) Clonazepam...
(6) Oorazepete

(Bl Not more than 300 milligrams of ethylmorphine per 100 milliliters or not more than 15
milligrams per dosage unit, with one or more
active, nonnarcotic ingredients in recognized
therapeutic amounts

(8) Not more than 50 milligrams of morphine per
100 milliliters or per 100 grams, with one or
more active, nonnarcotic ingredtonts in recognized therapeutic amounts

pf

1670

specifically
in another
compound,
which con-

INSTRUCTION NO.
You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t u n d e r t h e l a w s of t h e S t a t e of Utah
Phenyl-2-Propanone,
ever,

or P-2-P, is not a controlled substance.

if a s u b s t a n c e has b e e n l a w f u l l y made a controlled

How-

substance

u n d e r t h e F e d e r a l C o n t r o l l e d S u b s t a n c e s Act, t h e n i t i s c o n t r o l l e d
u n d e r t h e Utah C o n t r o l l e d S u b s t a n c e s
Therefore,
A: 1.

B:

Act,

if the State proves beyond a r e a s o n a b l e

doubt:

T h a t t h e United S t a t e s Attorney General by r u l e
scheduled the s u b s t a n c e P-2-P or Phenyl-2-Propanone a s a c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e ;

2.

T h a t t h e United S t a t e s A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l m a d e a
finding, after a h e a r i n g in accordance with his
r u l e m a k i n g p r o c e d u r e s , w h i c h a t l e a s t a l l o w e d for
a h e a r i n g on the r e c o r d , t h a t P-2-P h a s a p o t e n t i a l
for a b u s e ;

3.

T h a t t h e United S t a t e s A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l f o u n d t h a t
t h e substance P-2-P:
a . Has a p o t e n t i a l for a b u s e l e s s t h a n t h e d r u g s
on schedules I and I I ;
b . Has a c u r r e n t l y a c c e p t e d m e d i c a l u s e i n t r e a t ment i n the United S t a t e s ; and
c . Abuse of t h e s u b s t a n c e m a y l e a d to m o d e r a t e
o r low p h y s i c a l d e p e n d e n c e o r h i g h p s y c h o l o g i c a l
dependence; and

A.

T h a t n o t i c e of s a i d a c t i o n w a s p r o p e r l y p u b l i s h e d i n
i n t h e F e d e r a l R e g i s t e r a n d t h e Code of F e d e r a l Regulations.; or

T h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l p r o p e r l y f o u n d ,
p u r s u a n t to a h e a r i n g and i n accordance with his r u l e making a u t h o r i t y , t h a t P-2-P was an immediate p r e c u r s e r
in t h a t :
a . t h e A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l h a s f o u n d i t to be a n d b y
r e g u l a t i o n d e s i g n a t e d as b e i n g t h e principal compound
u s e d , o r p r o d u c e d p r i m a r i l y for u s e , i n t h e m a n u f a c t u r e of a c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e ;
b. I t is an immediate chemical intermediary used or
l i k e l y to be u s e d i n t h e m a n u f a c t u r e of a c o n t r o l l e d
substance; and

c. The control of which is is necessary to prevent
curtail, or limit the manufacture of such controlled
substance.
then you may determine t h a t the substance P-2-P or Phenyl-2-Propanone is a controlled substance under Utah Law.

-2-

INSTRUCTION NO

. b>

You are instructed that Phenyl-2-Propanone or
P2P is a controlled substance under the laws of the State of
Utah.

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff
1
\1

VS
MICHAEL LEWIS GREEN
AKA JAMES ALVIN DOUGLAS
Defendant

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO.

881000063

:

;
'

The Defendant has filed Motions to Suppress based upon three
separate grounds. The first that the evidence obtained pursuant
to the search should be disallowed because of invalidity of the
warrant. The argument is analyzed under several different criteria
by the Defendant. That the search warrant was invalid, the
affidavit contained insufficient information on which probable
cause could be established, that it contained mis-statements
which should be excised there-from, and that it omitted information,
which had it been supplied, would have negated any probable cause.
The Defendant argues the language in the affidavit is that
of the Sheriff's Deputy rather than of the confidential informant.
Though the language was not an exact quote of the confidential
informant, the confidential informant generally stated that he
believed the premises contained the hidden lab in the garage and
he believed it to be producing some kind of an illegal substance.
That, together with the information supplied from the Sheriff's
investigator and Mr. Art Terkelson, would lead to the same conclusion and statement that the affiant believed that there to be
a clandestine lab, producing legal substances located in the
residence of Perry.
The alleged mis-statements as characterized by the Defendant,
in the Courts opinion, should not be excised from the affidavit
and even if they were, there is still sufficient circumstantial
information to support probable cause.
The omission of information regarding the previous owner
of the home, Mr. Bob Wendell, in this Courts opinion would not
affect the contents of the affidavit against the State. Whether
the previous occupant of the house was a chemistry teacher of
high school is of little relevance to the alleged use of the
premises at the time of question.

- 2 -

The next basis for attack by the Defendant, is that the
information supplied to the Court was stale, and therefore
invalidates the issuance of the warrant. Only part of the information was older, in fact after receiving the information
from the confidential informant, the Sheriff's detectives continued to observe the premises for a substantial period thereafter. If in fact the lab at the premises were used as a
clandestine lab, it was not the kind of operation that would
likely cease and become stale in a matter of a few months.
Secondly, the continued surveilance up until the first part of
September, shortly before the issuance of the warrant would
substantiate the fact that the information was not stale. The
follow-up surveilance and observation of the premises by the
Sheriff's Office would indicate caution on their part to not
seek a warrant based only upon the information supplied by the
confidential informant but rather as supported the investigation.
The last basis for attack on the warrant is the officers
exercise of improper zeal in execution of the warrant. The
friend of the Defendant and co-occupant of the house may have
standing to argue constitutional rights before this Court.
Certainly this Defendant has no standing to argue any violations
of her constitutional rights.
Taking the Defendant back to the premises upon his arrest
rather than to the police station or otherwise, appears under
the circumstances of this case to be the proper exercise of
caution both for the protection of the Defendant and for the
police officers. Most importantly, there appears to be nothing
in the action of the police officer which this Court construes
to be malicious. Therefore the Motion to Suppress the evidence
based upon the alleged faulty search warrant are denied.
The next basis for the Motion to Suppress, is that Andre
Pommier, the confidential informant was a Government employee or
agent when he discovered the lab and therefore breached the
Defendants constitutional rights. This Court indicated at the
time of the hearing that its not convinced that Mr. Pommier was
an agent of the State, nor that he was acting as an agent at the
time he was in the Defendants home and conducting, which has been
characterized as, investigations. There is nothing to show that
his "investigations" had anything to do with his positions as
voluntary fireman or Deputy Fire Marshall.
The Defendant would suggest that because of Mr. Pommierfs
illegal activity, the State therefore should be precluded from
using the evidence. The State on the other hand suggests that
Mr. Pommier should be commended as a concerned citizen. This
Court cannot condone Mr. Pommier1s activity which was an
apparent tresspass of the Defendants rights. That trespass,
however, does not vitiate the State's ability to use the information even though obtained by unlawful activity by Mr. Pommier.

- 3 -

The next Motion to Suppress by the Defendant is that
certain chemicals were destroyed. This situation usually arises
when the evidence which is being tested is destroyed during the
testing. In this case, the evidence which was tested has not
been destroyed and there is sufficient left for examination by
the Defendant. The Defendant argues that other chemicals were
destroyed and therefore all the evidence should be suppressed.
To the contrary, evidence which was destroyed was considered to
create a hazard and the State had no facilities in which to store
the same. Identities of those chemicals appears not to be an
issue here and those chemicals which are an issue and which were
tested and could have been re-tested by the Defendant.
In addition to all of the above, there appears no malice or
bad faith exercised on behalf of the State in destruction of
that evidence, and therefore the Motion to Suppress by the
Defendant is hereby denied.
Dated this

1st day of March, 1989.

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
hold over; he mav'resign. Tooele
P e La Mare, 90 *U. 4«, 51) V. 2d
A. L. R. 1S2, superseding 90 U.
2d 1051, and following Slate ex
v. Christensen, 84 U. 185, :>5 P.

County v.
1155, 10G
23, 39 P.
rel. Slain
2d 775.

Indefinite term of office.
General rule that term for which officer
is elected shall be fixed before election is
inapplicable where voters, at same eleetion, vote on officer and also on proposed
coustitutional amendment extending term

ART. V, § 1

of that office. Snow v. Keddington, 113 U.
:?25, 195 P . 2d 234.
Collateral References.
Beginning or expiration of term of elective office where no time fixed by Law, 80
A . L. 11. 1200, 135 A. L. It. 1173.
Power of hoard to make appointment to
office or contract extending beyond its
own term, 11!) A. L. I{.
'A'.U't.
" U n t i l " as word of inclusion or exclusion where term of office runs until a
specified day, 10 A. L. K. 1100.

Sec. 10. [Oath of office.]
All officers made elective or appointive by this Constitution or by the
laws made in pursuance thereof, before entering upon the duties of
their respective offices, shall take and subscribe the following oath or
affirmation: "1 do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support, obey
and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution
of this State, and that I will discharge the duties of my office with
fidelity. ["]
Compiler's Notes.
The quotation marks at the end of this
section have been carried in brackets in
all compilations since Kevised tStatutes of

deputy county clerk (a person duly authorized to administer oaths) although he
did not
go through some formal ritual,
w i t h tlie
raising of his right hand. State
v. Mathews, 13 U. (2d) 391, 375 P . 2d 392.

lb98#

Comparable Provision.
Montana Const., Art. XTX, § 1.
Cross-Reference.
O-iths of oflicers

5°-l-l
'
'
Bond required in addition to oath.
S t a t u t e requiring state treasurer to give
bond is not unconstitutional on ground
that legislature could not add to requirement iu this section. State .ex rel. Stain
v. Christensen, 84 U. 185, 35 P . 2d 775.
Formal ritual unnecessary.
A deputy county recorder took the oath
of office, required by this section, by his
signing of oath form duly notarized by a

Supreme Court justices required to take
0a,t!h
'
Judges of the Supreme Court subscribe
to this oath when entering upon their
duties as justices thereof. Critchlow v.
Monaon, 102 U. 378, 131 P . 2d 794. For
sequel to this case, see State ex rel. Jugler
v. Grover, 102 U. 459, 132 P. 2d 125.
CoUateral References.
OflicersC= 3 3G(l).
67 C.J.S. Officers § 38.
Member of grand or petit jury as officer
within constitutional or statutory provisions in relation to oath or affirmation,
118 A. L. R. 1098.

ARTICLE V
D I S T R I B U T I O N OF P O W E R S
Section.
1. [Three departments of government.]

Section 1. [Three departments of government.]
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided
into three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the
Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly
belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any functions
199

ART. V, § 1

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

appertaining to either of the others, except, in the eases herein expressly
directed or permitted.
Comparable Provision.
Montana Const., Art. IV, § I.
Cross-References.
Kxecutive department, Const. Art. V I I .
Judicial department, Const. Art. V I I I .
Legislative department, Const. Art. VI.
Municipal powers not delegable, Const.
Art. VI, §21).
Crimes and criminal procedure.
This section precludes the Supremo
Court from declaring any conduct a crime,
no matter how morally reprehensible it
may be, where it is not so declared by
the legislature. State v. Johnson, 44 U. IS,
137 P . 032.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law, 7735-20, is not violative of this section as
depriving the court of any constitutional
power of authority guaranteed to it. Mnt a r t v. P r a t t , 51 U. 240, 170 1\ 07.
Declaratory judgments.
Quoting from Anderson on Declaratory
Judgments, § 8, p. - 7 , "A controversy, in
the sense in which the word is used in
the Constitution in defining judicial power,
particularly of the federal courts, must
be one t h a t is appropriate for judicial
determination as distinct from a difference or*disf>ute of hypothetical or abstract
character or from one which is academic
or moot, but must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relation of the
parties in adverse legal interest, and must
be a real substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree
conclusive in character as distinct from
an opinion or advice of what the law
would be on a hypothetical state of facts."
Lyon v. Bateman, 119 U. 434, 228 P . 2d
818.
Declaratory statutes affecting
existing
judgments.
After court has interpreted or construed statute on trial of case, and rendered judgment, legislature cannot affect
judgment by declaratory or explanatory
statute, giving statute, under which judgment was rendered, different construction.
In re Handley's Estate, 15 IT. 212, 49 P .
S29, 02 Am. St. Rep. 920, on motion for
rehearing in 7 U. 49, 24 P . 073, appeal
dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, 151
IT. S. 443, 3S L. Ed. 227, 14 S. Ct. 386.
When court construes statute, involved
in case, and holds that it has certain
effect and renders judgment accordingly,
legislature cannot thereafter declare t h a t
s t a t u t e , as to case in which judgment was

rendered, had effect other than that declared by court. In re Ilandlev's Estate,
15 U. 212, 49 P . 829, G2 Am. St". Rep. 92G,
on motion for rehearing in 7 U. 49, 24 P.
0*73, appeal dismissed on jurisdictional
grounds, 151 U. S. 443, 38 L. Ed. 227, 14
H. Ct. 3S0.
Delegation of judicial power.
Irrigation District Art of 1909, as
amended by Laws of 3911, did not violate
this section on ground that judicial powers
were conferred upon certain persons.
State ex rel. Lundberg v. Green River Irr.
Dist., 40 U. 83, 119 P. 1039.
Uniform Land Registration Act of 1917
was not invalid as attempting to confer
judicial authority on county clerks of
state as ex officio registrars of title in violation ot* this provision. Ashton-Jenkins
Co. v. Bramcl, 5G II. 587, 192 P. 375, 11 A.
L. It. 752.
Workmen's Compensation Act is not invalid because it delegates to industrial
commission the power to hear, consider,
and determine controversies between litigants as to ultimate liability, or their
property rights. Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm., 57 U. 240, 194 P. 122.
While term "judicial power" embraces
all suits and actions whether public or
private, it docs not necessarily include
the power to hear and determine matters
not necessarily in nature of suit or action
between parties and does not apply to
those cases where the judgment is exercised or is to be exercised as a mere
incident to execution of a ministerial
power or duty. Citizens' Club v. Welling,
83 U. 81, 27 P . 2d 23.
Industrial commission is an administrative body and has no power 1o perform judicial acts or exercise judicial functions,
and hence has no jurisdiction of action to
recover additional compensation for employees employed on public works on
ground that they were not paid prevailing
wage rate. Logan City v. Industrial Comm.,
85 U. 131, 38 P . 2d 7G9.
Order of public service commission denying a certificate of public convenience and
necessity is not an exercise of a judicial
function within meaning of this section.
Mulcahy v. Public Service Comm., 101 U.
245, 117 P . 2d 298.
Statutes empowering the secretary of
state to revoke charters of social clubs for
violating law arc valid as against the
contention that judicial power is conferred
upon the secretary of state. Citizens' Club
v. Welling, 83 TJ. 81, 27 P . 2d 23; Kent
Club v. Toronto, G IT. (2d) 67, 305 P . 2d
870.
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